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I. INTRODUCTION
Current economic conditions have led many United States compa-
nies to search for ways of regaining competitive positions in interna-
tional markets.' Japan's enviable success in international trade
suggests several possible remedies, 2 one of which is development of
more harmonious labor-management relations. 3 Some commentators
have opposed the application of these cooperative labor practices in the
United States, claiming that cultural differences are insurmountable.4
Japanese-style labor relations, however, have been implemented in the
United States, either by conscious imitation,5 or through similar, do-
mestically developed systems termed quality of worklife6 and partici-
1 Burck, Working Smarter, FORTUNE, June 15, 1981, at 79 (see other articles in this series
concluding in the Aug. 24, 1981, issue).
2 One proposal suggests establishing closer government-business ties to facilitate long term
planning, provide incentives for growth industries, and formulate solutions for the dying manu-
facturing sector. Bendix, Interaction of Business and Government in Japan: Lessonsfor the United
States? 15 INT'L LAw. 571 (1981). Another recommends creation of U.S. foreign trading compa-
nies. Inoue, Structural Changes and Labour Market Policies in Japan, 118 INT'L LAB. Rav. 223
(1979). But ef C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 11-13 (1982) (stressing that Japa-
nese economic success is attributable to their economic system as a whole, not to any isolated
institution which can be imported by other countries).
3 See, eg., MANAGEMENT BY JAPANESE SYSTEMS (S. Lee & G. Schwendiman ed. 1982); R.
PASCALE & A. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT (1981) (analysis of Japanese labor
management principles and their use in U.S. companies) [hereinafter cited as PASCALE & ATHOS].
4 Eg., Takeuchi, Productivity: Learningfrom the Japanese, 23 CAL. MGMT. RFv. 5, 13 (1981).
5 See, ag., MANAGEMENT BY JAPANESE SYSTEMS, supra note 3.
6 Davis, Enhancing the Quality of Work Lie Developments in the U.S., 116 INT'L LAB. Rnv.
'53, 61 (1977).
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pative management programs.7 Speculations about and experiments
with Japanese labor relations have become popular,8 and the potential
legal consequences of the trend deserve attention. Japanese labor prac-
tices may not be compatible with the adversary nature of United States
labor law, which does not lend itself to labor-management
cooperation.9
Japanese cultural history substantially influences that nation's la-
bor relations practices, mitigating the actual effect of post-war Western
statutes and leftist labor federations.' ° Japanese society expects har-
mony between workers and their employers which contrasts with the
expectations of conflict evident in the United States.' Even so, a re-
view of a few United States attempts to apply Japanese practices shows
some success even in trade union organized shops.12 United States pro-
grams stress labor-management cooperation to improve morale, solve
production problems, or deal with employee grievances.' 3 Joint em-
ployee-employer committees which concern themselves with subjects
typically reserved for collective bargaining may violate the National
Labor Relations Act.
14
The history of the United States labor movement involved consis-
tent management attempts to destroy unions. 15 Consequently, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board 6 and the courts assume that employers
dominate joint committees and prevent employees from exercising the
7 See Cordova, Workers' Participation in Decisions Within Enterprises: Recent Trends and
Problems, 121 INr'L LAB. REa. 125 (1982); Halal & Brown, Participative Management.- Myth and
Reality, 23 CAL. MGMT. RaV. 20 (1981).
8 See Guest, Quality of Work Lfe--Learning from Tarrytown, HARV. Bus. REv. July-Aug.
1979, at 76 (counts 450 articles about participation management published between 1975 and
1979).
9 See infra notes 202-231 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 23-168 and accompanying text.
I1 See infra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 5-7. See infra notes 175-189, 279-286 and accompanying text.
13 Id
14 National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-197) (1976)), as amended by Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (1959) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1976)). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976) pro-
vides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to
it: .... " The statutes cited above will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the National
Labor Relations Act, the NLRA, or the Act.
15 See infra notes 202-208 and accompanying text.
16 Created by the NLRA, Pub. L. No. 198, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) as amended by the Labor
Management Relations Act, supra note 9, 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976). The National Labor Rela-
tions Board will hereinafter be referred to as the Board.
Japanese Labor Relations
5:585(1983)
free choice which the NLRA protects.17 Thus, the law favors tradi-
tional trade union organization. Recent decisions, though, have not
applied this per se assumption, but instead have approved employer-
employee cooperative organization when there was no evidence of ac-
tual employer dominance. 8 This evolving standard is promising for
the further development of Japanese-style labor relations in the United
States.
The United States' pervasive legal philosophy, emphasizing indi-
vidual rights and duties, will limit labor-management cooperation be-
cause those values add an element of conflict to the relationship.
Unlike the Japanese, United States employees and employers depend
on their legal rights to protect their respective positions and to resolve
disputes. 9 From a Japanese perspective, this focus on individual legal
entitlements as enforced by adjudication erodes group harmony be-
cause it makes the individual's welfare more important than that of the
group.20 It determines winners and losers rather than encouraging
compromise. 21 A recent case involving Honda of America's attempt to
ward off an United Auto Workers organizing effort illustrates this ten-
sion between cooperative labor relations and adversarial United States
labor law.' United States law does not present an absolute barrier to
the use of Japanese style labor relations, but implementation will re-
quire modification of both United States legal interpretation and of
Japanese management models to protect workers' rights.
II. JAPANESE LAW AND LABOR RELATIONS
A. The Role of Law in Japanese Thought and History
Law in Japan, as in all other cultures, exists in symbiotic relation-
ship with the society of which it is a part, mirroring some elements and,
through its institutions, shaping others. 3 Japan's attitudes toward law
have been formed by its peculiar geography, history and culture.24 Ja-
pan remained isolated from the rest of the world for long periods and
developed a cohesive society that was not subject to innovations
17 See infra notes 204-31 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 240-52 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 142-168, 289-91 and accompanying text.
20 Id
21 See infra notes 287-301 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 302-16 and accompanying text.
23 Henderson & Anderson, Japanese Law: A Profile, in AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE CIV-
ILZATION 569 (A. Tiedemann ed. 1974).
24 Noda, The Far Eastern Conception of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COM-
PARATIVE LAW 120, 129 (1971).
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brought by traders and immigrants.25 Traditional Japan26 was an agri-
culturally based, feudal society in which social status regulated rela-
tionships between individuals.27  Although civil wars disrupted this
structure at several points in its history, the Tokugawa Shogunate,28
established in the early seventeenth century, governed 250 years of
peaceful, stable feudal life.2 9 Change was infrequent,30 and family ties
to the land created long-term personal relationships within the social
hierarchy:
For the successive generations of Tokugawa bureaucrats and "judges"
then, Japan was almost everything; other vague lands furnished curiosi-
ties, but really did not matter much. The whole country was one big rice
estate, with daimyo sub-estates. Every bag of rice was precisely allotted
before it was planted; each person was classified before he was born and
registered soon thereafter. After the chaos and strife of times past, peace
and security seemed quite enough to give one's retainers. All was new
administration; there was no political activity worth noticing, just a bit of
graft and intrigue to be rooted out by an occasional confiscation or by
diligent application of ancestral moral precepts. Movement was slow,
change imperceptible; efficacy of human effort to refashion their world
was negligible. Such a charicature of the Shogunate structure and think-
ing is of course oversimplified, but we suggest that it does nevertheless
capture... thought in Edo.
3 1
Japanese religion and philosophy complemented this social struc-
25 Id at 130. Despite its general isolation, Japanese culture is increasingly eclectic, adopting
elements of Chinese culture, see infra note 29 and accompanying text, as well as European and
U.S. influences. Jansen, On Foreign Borrowing, in JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 18 (A. Craig
ed. 1979).
26 This term refers to Japan before the Meiji Restoration of 1868. After a coup restored polit-
ical power to the emperor, trade with Western nations expanded and Japan began adopting West-
ern law and other elements of foreign cultures. E. REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION
114-121 (1974). See also R. MASON & J. CAIGER, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 214-19 (1972).
27 E. REISCHAUER, supra note 26, at 1-120. In the Tokugawa era there were four hierarchical
social classes: the samurai warrior bureaucrats, peasants, artisans and merchants. Id at 90. See
also infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
28 Tokugawa Ieyasu assumed the title of shogun (supreme military leader) in 1603 after a
series of military victories which brought all of Japan under his control. Id at 80-81. This era in
Japanese history is also known as the Edo Period, named for the government's capital city which
has since been renamed Tokyo. R. MASON & J. CAIGER, supra note 26, at 157, 216.
29 R. MASON & J. CAIGER, supra note 26, at 126-71. See also REISCHAUER, supra note 26, at
80-112. See generally STUDIES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN JAPAN (J.
Hall & M. Jansen ed. 1968); Totman, Tokugawa Japan, in AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE CIVI-
LIZATION 97 (A. Tiedemann, ed. 1974); Mayo, Late Tokugawa and Eary Afe/i Japan, in id at 131.
30 By 1639 the Tokugawa bureaucracy had closed Japan's ports to foreign trade, fearing the
growing power of Dutch, English, Portuguese and Chinese merchants and missionaries. This
"closed country" policy endured for more than 200 years. R. MASON & J. CAIGER, supra note 26,
at 169. See also infra note 45 and accompanying text.




ture. Japan's indigenous religion, Shinto, taught that man was an inte-
gral part of nature and wholly subject to its dictates.3 2 Buddhism,
which came from India and China in the sixth century,33 required that
man submit to ultimate spiritual law or dharma 4 If one adjusted
one's mind to Buddhist precepts, wordly problems would dissolve. 5
Both of these religions encouraged people to accept life's circum-
stances.36 Japan also adopted Confucianism along with many other
elements of Chinese culture in the early sixth century.37 By compari-
son to Shinto and Buddhism, Confucianism appears to be more practi-
cal than ascetic, focusing on social truths by which interpersonal
relationships could be preserved and nurtured. Respect for tradition
and for one's family, elders and social superiors were central principles
as was reciprocal regard for one's inferiors.38 One who preserved social
harmony was a moral man, and justice came from his intuitive leader-
ship, not from a code of laws.39
The Japanese language contains words which express these stan-
dards of ethical conduct. On describes the intangible, incalculable
debts which one owes to one's close benefactors (parents, occasionally
employers, or the nation);40 girl refers to obligations owed to more dis-
tant persons, and to one's equals or inferiors.41 Observance of both on
32 See Shunz6, Shint: Japanese Ethnocentrism, in THE JAPANESE MIND: ESSENTIALS OF JAP-
ANESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE 24 (C. Moore ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as THE JAPANESE
MIND]. The emperor's divinity, another Shinto doctrine, fed the ethnocentricity already present in
Japan's closed society. See id at 27-31.
33 Hideo, Some Japanese Cultural Traits andReligions, in THE JAPANESE MIND, supra note 32,
at 113.
34 Shinsho, Buddhism of the One Great Vehicle (Mahayna), in THE JAPANESE MIND, supra
note 32, at 33.
35 Hideo, supra note 33, at 115.
36 Id
37 E. REISCHAUER, supra note 26, at 19. Confucian and Buddhist principles dominated Prince
Shotuku's written constitution in 604 A.D. Id at 20. Their overt influence persisted until the
central government weakened in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Id at 44-45. The Tokugawa
regime revived Confucian ideals because they provided a spiritual rationale for obedience, loyalty
and political stability. Id at 89-91. 4ccord R. MASON & J. CAIGER, supra note 26, at 24-25, 171-
77.
38 H. SMITH, THE RELIGIONS OF MAN 179-87 (1958) (discussing Confucian concepts of delib-
erate tradition and the well-conducted life).
39 Id at 185. See also Jansen, On Foreign Borrowing, in JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 18, 44
(A. Craig ed. 1979).
40 R. BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF JAPANESE CULTURE
98-113 (1946). See also Kim & Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese
Conception oLaw, 28 INTL COMP. L.Q. 491, 499 (1979).
41 Azumi, Japanese Society: A Sociological View, in AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE CIVILI-
ZATION, supra note 23, at 525-26. Unlike on, girl is measurable and can be discharged, Benedict,
supra note 40, at 116, by loyal, helpful conduct, Azumi, supra, at 526.
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and girl promotes wa, harmony or concord, thereby preserving family
and social order.42 Further, the emotionally rich concept of wa can be
attained only if one's obligations are performed voluntarily and suf-
fused with ninjo, sensitivity.43 A sense of duty motivates personal ac-
tions, enforced by an implicit sense of honor and the fear of losing face
if one fails to uphold girl.44
The Tokugawa period ended in 1867-68 with increasing foreign
trade and influence. 45 In the century or so since then, Japan has rap-
idly evolved into an urban, relatively Westernized nation which bears
little superficial resemblance to its historic antecedents. Two scholars
have asserted, however, that "[c]ontemporary Japan is Tokugawa Ja-
pan transformed, but not rejected . . . . Every foreign adaptation,
every modernization, has been embraced by Japan, without fundamen-
tally altering her national character."'
Though one should be aware of the potential for inaccuracy inher-
ent in any generalized statement about national character,47 certain
elements typify Japanese thought and culture.48 First, Japan's homoge-
42 Kim & Lawson, supra note 40, at 499-500. See also Takeyoshi, 77Te Status of the Individual
in the Notion ofLaw, Right and Social Order in Japan, in THE JAPANESE MIND, supra note 32, at
262, 264; Hajime, Basic Features of the Legal, Political, and Economic Thought of Japan, in THE
JAPANESE MIND, supra note 32, at 145-46; T. ROHLEN, infra note 50, at 34-46.
43 See Doi, Giri-Ninjo: An Interpretation, in ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN JAPAN
327 (R. Dore ed. 1967).
44 Kim & Lawson, supra note 40, at 501.
45 U.S. Admiral Matthew Perry's intrusion in 1853 not only opened Japan's long closed door,
but caused a domestic political crisis which split the nation into two factions: the shogunate's
followers, who were resigned to accepting foreign trade because Japan's military strength had
declined, and xenophobic imperial loyalists who eventually took power. E. REiSCHAUER, supra
note 26, at 114-21. Despite its original attitude, the Meiji Empire also yielded to foreign pressure
to open Japan to trade. R. MASON & J. CAIGER, supra note 26, at 217-19.
46 Kim & Lawson, supra note 40, at 495.
47 Noda, supra note 24, at 120-21, 129.
48 Representing various opinions are: R. BENEDICT, supra note 40, at 98-117, 300 (Japanese
dominated by sense of unpayable indebtedness to parents, teachers, emperor and others, causing
feelings of resentment and shame), but cf. Azumi, supra note 41, at 526-27 (Benedict's thesis is
criticized as overexaggeration. Similarities between Japanese and Western peoples overshadow
their differences); Noda, supra note 24, at 129-30 (sentimental, nervous and choleric); M.
MARUYAMA, THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR IN MODERN JAPANESE POLITICS 13-19, 275-80 (1963)
(maintaining face and powerful social status central); DeVos,Achievement Orientation, Social Self-
Identity and Japanese Economic Growth, in MODERN JAPAN: AN INTERPRETIVE ANTHOLOGY 151
(I. Scheiner ed. 1974) (filial obligations motivate strong desire for achievement); Doi, supra note
43, at 327-29 (amae or dependence as primary psychological characteristic); W. PRICE, THE JAPA-
NESE MIRACLE AND PERIL 1-23, 311-14, 321-37 (1971) (Japanese people as racially conceited,
duplicitous and psychologically driven to achieve economic superiority). See generally E. TOM-
LIN, JAPAN 137-56 (1973); JAPANESE CULTURE, ITS DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS (R.
Smith & R. Beardsley ed. 1971); R. HALLORAN, JAPAN: IMAGES AND REALITIES (1969); THE
JAPANESE MIND, supra note 32.
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nous population shares common, traditional values.49 The family is the
center of society and other social relationships are modeled to imitate
it.50 Thus, the group's interest, not the individual's, must prevail to
ensure social harmony.51 This group consciousness makes social ap-
proval critically important for one's status and self-respect.52 Secondly,
life for the Japanese is an indeterminant "given" rather than something
which the individual constructs and controls. 3 Emotion is important
because it integrates man with nature and helps one understand the
subtle interdependence of life as an organic whole.54 Finally, Japanese
thought is hostile or indifferent to logic because such analysis separates
49 N. SASAKI, MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCrURE IN JAPAN 1-2 (198 1). See also von
Mehren, Some Relections on Japanese Law, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1486, 1492 (1958).
50 See, eg., T. ROHLEN, FOR HARMONY AND STRENGTH 14 (1974) (bank employees think of
themselves as a household and use the same words when referring to their bank as they do when
referring to their individual, private family groups); von Mehren, supra note 49, at 1493 (business
firm regarded as family); R. MINEAR, JAPANESE TRADITION AND WESTERN LAW 94 (1970) (state
as family); Moore, Editor's Supplement: The Enigmatic Japanese Mind, in THE JAPANESE MIND,
supra note 32, at 288, 300 (emperor as head of national family). See also Masaaki, The Status and
the Role of the Individual in Japanese Society, in THE JAPANESE MIND, id at 245, 252. But gf.
Who's Happy Now, infra note 262 (more U.S. workers consider their companies as family than do
Japanese workers).
51 Takeyosbi, supra note 42, at 264. The status of the individual in modem Japanese society
is, however, a complicated paradox. Moore, supra note 50, at 300. Traditional thought empha-
sized submission to all the "irrational elements of the universe," Hideki, Modern Trend of Western
Civilization and Cultural Peculiarities in Japan, in THE JAPANESE MIND, supra note 32, at 58, yet
also encouraged individual achievement, Tesshi, The Individual in Japanese Ethics, in THE JAPA-
NESE MIND, id at 234, 236-37, 241 (discussing bushido, the way of the samurai warrior). See also
Masaaki, supra note 50, at 253. Japan's post-war industrialization may have strengthened the role
of the individual while weakening group ties, a tendency which leads some commentators to pre-
dict that Japanese attitudes will eventually converge with those of the West. Karsh & Levine, The
Concept of a National Industrial Relations System, in WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS IN JAPAN 7-13
(K. Okochi, B. Karsh & S. Levine ed. 1974). See also Azumi, supra note 41, at 531; N. SASAKI,
supra note 49, at 136; Kawashima, infra note 58, at 57-59. But see, e.g., Dore, Industrial Relations
in Japan and Elsewhere in JAPAN: A COMPARATrvE ViEw, supra note 39, at 324, 325 (Japan's
cultural traits will persist as her economy matures); Doi, supra note 43, at 333 (views the Japanese
as caught in a frustrating psychological trap between Western individualism on one hand and a
desire for traditional dependent relationships on the other). T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 51-52,
sees no contradiction between the traditional Japanese concept of self and modem industrial life.
From his study of a large Japanese bank he concluded that workers were very competitive yet saw
personal achievement as enhancing the welfare of the company. Also, by accepting their superi-
ors' authority, employees gained a disciplined freedom from the distractions of personal ambition
and could concentrate on doing their best for the entire firm's benefit. Id
52 M. MARuyAMA, supra note 48.
53 Hideki, supra note 5 1, at 54, stating that the Western mind confronts its environment while
the Eastern mind adapts to its surroundings. See also Shunzo, supra note 32, at 24 (regarding
human empathy with nature).
54 Hajime, supra note 42, at 145. See also Sh6son, The Relation of Philosophical Theory to
Practical Affairs in Japan, in THE JAPANESE MIND, supra note 32, at 4; Shunza, supra note 32, at
28; Hideki, supra note 51, at 59; Moore, supra note 50, at 296.
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inherently inseparable elements of life.55 Abstract reasoning is of little
value because it strips thought of feeling.56
These characteristics also include a traditional aversion toward
law as it is known in the West. Rules based on objective, fixed stan-
dards do not fit nuances of customary Japanese social patterns.57 Rec-
ognizing this, Tokugawa rulers restricted access to their central courts
and required disputants to resolve conflicts through conciliation be-
cause this procedure healed the parties' relationship, restoring harmony
to the village.58 Involvement in adjudicatory legal proceedings is con-
sidered dishonorable, even abhorrent,59 because to demand the per-
formance of giri as an individual right contributes nothing to social
harmony, but instead increases conflict, further eroding wa.6 ° Final
55 Kim & Lawson, supra note 40, at 496.
56 Noda, supra note 24, at 132-33. Noda describes the Japanese as "emotional anarchists," too
sensitive to think logically. This means they are also incapable of Western legal reasoning be-
cause they look for flexible, conciliatory solutions and do not understand the necessity of choosing
between two contradictory alternatives. Id at 133. "[Western] legal thought is based upon ex-
treme abstraction, considering man without taking his individuality into account .... " Rad-
bruch, I1 diritto nella visione goethiana delmondo: Riv. int. flu. dir. 1940, 202-03 quotedin id at 132.
See also Kim & Lawson, supra note 40, at 497-498; Hideki, supra note 51, at 56-57.
57 "[Indeterminate slocial obligations of this sort do not fit the lawsuit, which will inevitably
bring about a breach of the close personal relationships based on a spirit of 'wa.'" Takeyoshi,
supra note 42, at 263. Quoting Pascal, Noda contrasts Western "geometrical" legal thought with
Eastern law of the "subtle" mind. Noda, supra note 24, at 135.
58 Henderson & Anderson, supra note 23, at 577-79. See also Kawashima, Dispute Resolution
in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SoCIErY 41, 45
(A. von Mehren ed. 1963) (discussing the social vacuum in which inter-group disputes arose in
Tokugawa Japan) [hereinaftere cited as LAW IN JAPAN]; D. HENDERSON, VILLAGE "CONTRACTS"
IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN 12, 14, 17 (1975). Limiting access to the Edo courts not only encouraged
conciliation but also was the least expensive way to administer justice. See generally J. WIGMORE,
LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN (1941); N. SMITH, TOKUGAWA JAPAN (1937); Henderson,
Japanese Legal History of the Tokugawa Period- Scholars and Sources, in FIVE STUDIES IN JAPA-
NESE POLITICS (R. Ward ed. 1957) (annotated bibliography). For a theoretical analysis of similar
dispute resolution characteristics in another traditional society, a Tanzanian tribe, see Eisenberg,
Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637
(1976). Eisenberg contrasts the binary nature of Western fact finding and adjudication with a
highly personal settlement conducted by tribal elders. Id
In modern Japanese legal thought, conflict may still be considered the result of a wayward
individual who has strayed from the proper community of thought. In resolving the dispute, a
conciliator "re-awakens the spirit of cooperation" in the contestants. Noda, supra note 24, at 133.
Arguably, conciliation remains the most frequently used solution in modern Japan. See infra note
161. For statistics regarding personal injury settlements, see Kawashima, supra at 42. But cf.
Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 359 (1978) (criticizing
Kawashima's conclusion that the Japanese are any more averse to litigation than Western socie-
ties, and attributing any statistical variance to the institutional incapacity of the Japanese judicial
system). See also Henderson & Anderson, supra note 23, at 589 (trend toward litigation).
59 Kawashima, supra note 58, at 45. See also Noda, supra note 24, at 132.
60 Takeyoshi, supra note 42, at 266-67.
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judgment only perpetuates the division by assigning fault.6 1 Histori-
cally, the Japanese admired law as a repository of wisdom, but not as a
means of compulsion.62  As a consequence, the Japanese have rela-
tively little consciousness of individual legal rights as compared to peo-
ple in Western societies.6 3  Although post-war Japan adopted a
characteristically Western constitution and statutory scheme, these
function differently than their foreign counterparts.' Japanese law, in
contrast to the American legal goals of objectivity and precision, is
emotional and indeterminant s.6  Typical Japanese business contracts,
for example, are highly relational, 66 and constitute brief, formal repre-
sentations of friendship and trust between parties, rather than clause
after clause of specific performance obligations.6 7 If problems arise,
parties expect to resolve them by ad hoc negotiations. 8
Although the Japanese may use Western legal formalities, they
rarely intend to rely on law for enforcement. There is a definite "sepa-
ration of law on the books from law in reality. ' 69  This difference is
largely attributable to the persistant influence of Japan's heritage.7 °
The characteristic Japanese view of law is evident in the nation's labor
relations as well. The legal environment complements the manage-
61 Kawashima, supra note 58, at 43. Cf. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Col-
lective Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 270, 278, 284-86
(reasoning that the desire to win arbitration contests harms the long term relationship between
union and management).
62 Kim & Lawson, supra note 40, at 506.
63 Henderson & Anderson, supra note 23, at 571. Although feudal obligations were mutual,
no concept of enforceable rights developed as a parallel to duty. Beer, The Public Welfare Stan-
dard and Freedom of Expression in Japan, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY
YEARS 205, 212-14 (D. Henderson ed. 1968). See also Takeyoshi, supra note 42, at 263-67. The
idea of individual legal rights was first introduced in the Meiji Era and has yet to be fully ac-
cepted. For the Japanese, there is no logical contradiction in basing part of one's conduct on
political equality and another part on obedience to familial authority. T. ROHLEN, supra note 50,
at 59-60 n.12. See also von Mehren, supra note 49, at 1495-96; von Mehren, Commentary: Part !,
in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 58, at 190-92.
64 D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: LAWS AND POLICIES 169-72 (1973). This
author observes that Japanese law is sui generis, a product of its own unique development which
has incorporated European civil and common law into traditional Japanese ethics. Id at 164.
65 Kim & Lawson, supra note 40, at 508.
66 1. MAcNmiL, CONTRAcTs: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 12-16 (1978) (dis-
cussing discrete and relational aspects of contracts).
67 Hahn, Negotiating with the Japanese, 2 CAL. LAW. 20 (1982).
68 Id See also Takeyoshi, supra note 42, at 266; Kawashima, supra note 58, at 46-47.
69 von Mehren, supra note 49, at 1494. See also Nippon v. United States, 285 F.2d 766 (Ct. CL
1961) (suit by Japanese corporations on contract claims against the U.S. government): "MWIe are
dealing here not only with a different legal system but a different culture as well. Formal legal
standards play a far less pervasive role in Japan in the creation and adjusting of principles regulat-
ing conduct than they play in the West." Id at 768.
70 D. HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 163.
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ment style so often praised in United States publications.71
B. Attitudes About Work
Japanese labor relations are woven from the elements described in
the previous section. The successes and failures of Japanese labor
management exemplify the nation's homogeneous culture, the impor-
tance of the group over the individual, appreciation for life as an indi-
visible, complex whole, relationships based on trust and other
emotional ties, and the necessity of retaining society's respect.72
Guaranteed lifetime employment for permanent workers distin-
guishes Japanese labor practices from those of the United States, where
workers are highly mobile.73 Lifetime employment in Japan is made
possible by a cadre of temporary workers who are employed or laid off
as prosperous or slack economic conditions require.74 Company-spon-
sored training and retraining programs, together with frequent job ro-
tation, give firms further flexibility to cope with market fluctuations.7 5
Also, permanent employees may be assigned to completely different
tasks if their usual work is rendered unnecessary by production cut-
backs.76 During the 1973 oil crisis, surplus steel workers became tree
71 See, e.g., N. SASAKI, supra note 49, at 115; Dore, supra note 51, at 327-29; J. SIMMONS, infra
note 97; Drucker, What We Can Learn From Japanese Management, HARe. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr.
1971, at 110.
72 See supra noes 47-56 and accompanying text.
73 j. ABEGGLEN, MANAGEMENT AND WORKER: THE JAPANESE SoLUTION 62-74 (1973).
74 K. TAIRA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE LABOR MARKET IN JAPAN 183-87 (1970).
See also T. HANAMI, LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN TODAY 26 (1979). Approximately 20% of all
Japanese workers are temporary. Id at 25. U.S. employers respond to market demands differ-
ently. For most, there is no differentiation between permanent and temporary workers, so all are
subject to lay-off, though usually according to seniority. See B. MELTZER, APPENDIX TO LABOR
LAW 164-66 (2d ed.) (seniority provisions in an "Illustrative Collective Bargaining Agreement").
Seniority may create a de facto line between workers who are sure to stay and those, more recently
hired, who will probably be laid off when work slows. Cf. Drucker, supra note 71, at 113-14
(discussing benefits of Japanese seniority system and problems with the U.S. version).
75 T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 28-29. See PASCALE & ATHOS, supra note 3, at 78 (discussing
the success of Matsushita Electric Co., which is one of the world's 50 largest companies and mar-
kets its products under the Panasonic, Quasar, Technics and National brand names. Id at 37.)
Though this job rotation occurs in both union and non-union enterprises, it would be impossible
under most U.S. union contracts. See B. MELTZER, supra note 74. U.S. unions are organized
according to trade rather than by enterprise as in Japan. See infra notes 130-38 and accompany-
ing text. Since any given U.S. business may employ workers belonging to a variety of trade un-
ions, typically each contract strictly defines appropriate tasks. This guarantees work for each
union's members and prevents inter-union wage competition. Cross training or job rotation ig-
nores trade boundaries and may violate work preservation clauses of most U.S. labor agreements.
See B. MELTZER, supra note 74.
76 N. SASAKI, supra note 49, at 32-37. See also Drucker, supra note 71, at 116-17 (regarding
undefined job responsibilities and cross-training of Japanese managers).
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planters, landscaping company grounds until the market improved.77
Lifetime employment manifests the culture's emphasis on emo-
tional, long-term group membership and the employer often assumes
what in the United States are solely family functions.78 The company
may help arrange marriages,79 use its influence to get employees desira-
ble housing,80 and to secure good schooling for employees' children."'
Companies sponsor social events, recreation programs82 and holiday
celebrations,8 3 and assist similar, union organized events.8 4 This aspect
of corporate paternalism fits the Japanese character 5 and helps main-
tain a business as a cohesive social group.
8 6
Western business management practices which focus on efficiency
contrast with the Japanese attitude toward labor.8 7 During the indus-
trial revolution, many United States businesses regarded labor as sim-
ply one factor of production, like machinery or capital.8 This concept
77 T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 31.
78 N. SASAKI, supra note 49, at 7.
79 T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 240-42.
80 Id at 14-15, 212.
81 T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 29.
82 1d
83 T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 41.
84 Id at 186-87.
85 Dore, supra note 51, at 327. The term "paternalism" is in some ways misleading. In Japa-
nese corporations it is a bureaucratic, institutional concern for employee welfare to which all
employees are entitled and is distinct, therefore, from the benevolence of a family patriarch or
feudal-overlord. Id at 325-27. Cf. S. LEViNE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN POSTWAR JAPAN 35-41,
153-58 (1958) (comparing patriarchal to despotic types ofmanagement); Takeuchi, supra note 4, at
12 (distinction between paternal and maternal characteristics of-Japanese management style).
86 N. SAsAKI, supra note 49, at 2. See also ABEGGLEN, supra note 73, at I 11.
87 J. ABEGGLEN, supra note 73, at 111-15. Efficiency-oriented or scientific management is the
most "obvious routine, orthodox, and traditional managerial practice," according to C. GEORGE,
THE HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT THOUGHT 96 (1972).
88 S. MOISON, H. COMMAGER & W. LEUCHTENBERG, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC 373-75 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MORISON]. Since equipment represented a
company's largest capital investment, workers were expected to mold themselves to fit a machine's
most cost efficient operation, even if it meant working long shifts, seven days a week, under haz-
ardous conditions. Id Jobs were subdivided into the simplest possible tasks, further dehumaniz-
ing labor. M. NORTON, D. KATzmAN, P. Escor, H. CHUDACOFF, T. PATERSON & W. TUTTLE, A
PEOPLE AND A NATION 481-82 (1982) [hereinafter cited as NORTON]. See also Kochan, Empirical
Research andLabor Law: Lessons From Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector 1981 U. ILL. L.F.
161, 163 (1981). Large corporations became more numerous during this period, leading to imper-
sonal employer-employee relationships. MORISON, supra, at 373-74. Most scientific management
ideas came from Frederick Taylor's studies, which recommended efficiency, controlled produc-
tion, time-motion studies, and separating labor and management duties. C. GEORGE, supra note
87, at 92. Although his theories also included a recognition that labor and management have a
common interest in business success, Taylor's followers neglected his advice to provide a friendly,
motivating work environment. Id Later researchers, reacting to scientific management as ap-
plied, focused on the human character of the business enterprise. E. FLIPPO & B. MUNSINGER,
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:585(1983)
serves to encourage both labor and management to deliberately sepa-
rate work from personal life. This division is foreign to the Japanese.89
For them, various aspects of life are more intermingled; one's work and
family life blend.90 The archetypal American worker is regarded more
like a tool of production, tied to his employer solely by a job and a
paycheck.9 Hence, the basic philosophic differences between Japanese
and Western thought mentioned earlier9 2 are manifested in the
workplace.
Another complementary feature of work life in Japan is a closer
relationship between labor and management than that which com-
monly exists in the United States.93 This is, in part, a consequence of
Japan's feudal heritage and results in familial relationships in the
workplace.94  Management encourages workers to contribute their
ideas for improving company operations, a policy which appears to ac-
complish two things: (1) increased participation motivates workers to
take initiative and do the best job possible because they have a fuller
personal investment in the company's success, and (2) both efficiency
and the product quality improve through suggestions made by all levels
of employees.95 Although workers are not viewed as participating in
management, 96 their ideas are sought through "quality control circles",
(QC circles), 97 suggestion boxes, and, in Matsushita Electric Company,
MANAGEMENT 19-20 (1978). Both schools of thought continue to influence management educa-
tion in the United States. See W. HAYNES, J. MASSIE & M. WALLACE, MANAGEMENT. ANALYSIS,
CONCEPTS AND CASES 26 (1975).
89 See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
90 Id
91 T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 60.
92 See supra notes 23-71 and accompanying text.
93 D. HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 117-18.
94 T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 44, 59.
95 Takeuchi, supra note 4, at 8-13. "'Make Every Worker a Manager' and 'Make Every
Worker an Engineer' are slogans used which encourage personal investment." Id at 9.
96 PASCALE & ATHOS, supra note 3, at 83 (regarding Matsushita practices). Ninety percent of
Japanese firms employing more than 5,000 people and 70% of all companies have enterprise level
labor-management consultation schemes, according to a 1977 survey by the Ministry of Labor of
5,000 Japanese firms. Seventy-four percent also used workshop level suggestion systems. Both
employees and employers reported satisfaction with worker participation of this sort because it
enhanced understanding and cooperation. Ingami & Nakamura, paper submitted to the Interna-
tional Labour Organization's Symposium on Workers' Participation in Decisions Within Under-
takings on Workers' Participation Within the Enterprise in Japan 1-2, (The Hague, May 1981)
(published by the International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland). See also N. SAsmu, supra
note 49, at 52-53; Cordova, Workers' Participation Within Enterprises: Recent Trends and
Probles 121 INT'L LAB. REv. 125 (1982). Cf. ODAKA, TOWARD INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 15-17,
155-211 (1975) (arguing for more worker participation as a matter of right).
97 QC circles were pioneered as a formal program in Japan in 1962 through a coordinating
agency, the Japan Union of Scientists and Engineers. QC circles are small groups of volunteers
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by consulting with the union during development of six-month operat-
ing plans.
98
Labor and management in the United States, however, are histori-
cal adversaries.9 9 Factory workers suffered harsh working conditions
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 100 Their plight was
due in some degree to the influence of classical economic free market
theory,101 social Darwinism,102 and Frederick Taylor's scientific man-
agement system."°3 Resultant union organizing efforts met violent op-
position and frequent defeat at managements' hands.1 4 Although the
National Labor Relations Act010 and later legislation ended the general
warfare, the bitter legacy lingers in rhetoric, strikes and adversarial
contract negotiations.
Japanese managers also try to minimize the social distinctions be-
tween employees and management."° They routinely visit the produc-
tion site and often work alongside blue collar laborers to learn
production-line jobs and to maintain a thorough knowledge of the total
business operation.107 In the United States, this practice in a union
from both labor and management who meet regularly on company time to identify production
problems, and propose and study possible solutions. To work effectively, these groups often re-
quire technical training and the time and technology necessary to develop and test objects or
systems. Since their establishment in Japan, QC circles have become very popular and their num-
bers continue to expand. There were 5,000 circles in 1965 and more than 100,000 in 1979.
Takeuchi, supra note 4, at 9-11. See also J. SIMMONS, WORING TOGETHER: PARTICIPATION
FROM SHOPFLOOR TO BOARDROOM (1982); Obmae, Quality Control Circles: They Work andDon't
Work, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1982, at 18, col. 3.
98 PASCA.LE & ATHOS, supra note 3, at 83. Matsushita, however, is the only firm allowing this
degree of employee participation. T. PEMPEL, POLICY AND POLITICS IN JAPAN 108 (1982).
99 See infra notes 100-16, 202 and accompanying text.
100 NORTON, supra note 88, at 484-86. "In no other industrial nation were the hazards of
industry so great." MoIsoN, supra note 88, at 383.
101 The "iron law of wages" meant that the larger the labor supply, the lower the wages. Em-
ployers reasoned that workers were free to quit if working conditions displeased them. NORTON,
supra note 88, at 483.
102 "Survival of the fittest" rationalized the extreme wealth of successful industrialists in the
face of their employees' poverty. This "natural law" also justified no government regulation and
sanctified private property as a sign of divine favor. MORSON, supra note 88, at 372.
103 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
104 See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
105 See supra note 14.
106 Despite its traditionally hierarchical structure, the reciprocal nature of social obligations
kept Japanese culture from being a stratified, class conscious society. Society is viewed as a con-
glomerate of vertically organized groups with no horizontal links between persons of the same
status who are members of different groups. T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 190-91; see also
Pempel, supra note 98, at 96. In feudal Japan, the central courts adjudicated only diversity suits
because conciliation was not possible where there was no social pressure to restore "wa." See
Henderson & Anderson, supra note 23, at 577-78.
107 See PASCALE & ATHOS, supra note 3, at 308-09.
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shop may violate contractual job descriptions1 8 or may be grounds for
a grievance for taking work which belongs to a union employee' °9
The smaller differential between executive and worker salaries within
most Japanese companies may also contribute to a feeling a unity. 10
Moreover, promotion of former union leaders into management posi-
tions is not unusual in Japan, but is rare in the United States."'
Labor-management polarization is also avoided by management's
central conviction that people are the company's most important re-
source.11 2 Corporate officers recognize the threat posed by change and
accordingly make major decisions by consensus.' 13 Lower echelon staff
draft policy suggestions which are gradually passed upward for review
and amendment.' 4 When they are finally implemented, affected em-
ployees have been consulted and have long since adjusted to the
change." 5 Similarly, Japanese companies rarely discharge incompe-
tent employees, but instead assign them to unimportant jobs without
promotion opportunities."
16
Japanese management may also promote a corporate ideology to
108 See B. MELTZER, supra note 74, at 164 (temporary transfer provision of an "Illustrative
Collective Bargaining Agreement").
109 See id at 168 (work by non-bargaining unit employees permitted only in emergencies and
in other special circumstances).
110 Krishner, How the Japanese Manage in the U.S., FORTUNE, June 15, 1981, at 97, 103 (state-
ment of Hajima Nakai, executive managing director of Sanyo Electric Company and president of
its U.S. subsidiary). Kazuo Iwama, Sony chief executive officer, expressed shock that American
executives were paid as well as movie actors. Id
111 Kanabayashi, Getting to the Top Means a Union Stint in Japanese Industry, Wall St. J., Oct.
14, 1981, at 33, col. 4. A survey reported here showed 74.1% of 313 major Japanese firms have at
least one executive director who once served as a labor leader. In at least one firm, however, this
can be explained by the method of selecting union leaders. There, potential candidates for top
management positions held union office as part of their career training. Although these people
were nominally elected, they ran unopposed. T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 186. This crossover is
generally much more likely to occur in Japan than in the United States because lower echelon
management employees are eligible to be union members until they advance to positions which
have direct supervisory authority. See 6 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN pt. XII § 1.02[l][a][i] (Z.
Kitagawa ed. 1981).
112 Cf PASCALE & ATHOS, supra note 3, at 45 (referring to Matsushita); see also Moore, supra
note 50, at 298.
113 D. HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 114-15. Shop floor decisions may also be made by con-
sensus. See J. ABEGGLEN, supra note 73, at 128-30. This ringi system is often criticized as too
slow to suit the pace of modem markets. ODAKA, supra note 96, at 184-85. Other commentators,
however, suggest that the time consumed by reaching a decision is more than recompensed by
efficient implementation. Drucker, supra note 71, at 112. Accord Inagami & Nakamura, supra
note 96, at 8.
114 Inagami & Nakamura, supra note 46, at 8.
115 Id
116 T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 31. "Who would fire his children?" asked one past company
president. N. SAsAIu, supra note 49, at 7.
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maintain employee morale and foster loyalty to the organization.
These philosophies emphasize product excellence, customer service,
teamwork, and the company's responsibility to society as a whole. 17
Management hopes that workers will closely identify their personal in-
terests with those of the company. 18 Employees who exhibit the de-
sired qualities are given merit pay and promotions, 19 and non-
financial awards as well, such as certificates, mention in bulletin board
or newsletter announcements, and trips to national QC contests.120
In summary, the Japanese workplace reflects traditional Japanese
values. Work is not a separable, discrete activity but is bound up with
family, social relationships and moral worth. Ethical conduct, on and
giri, are motivated by the firm's philosophy and by its commitment to
employee welfare. Even efficient decision making is secondary to
maintaining wa. Further evidence of these cultural norms appears in
Japanese union organization and labor law function.
C. Unions and the Legal Environment
On its face, Japanese law gives supreme status to the workers' right
to organize. The Japanese Constitution guarantees the "right of work-
ers to organize and to bargain and act collectively"1 21 as a "fundamen-
tal human right" which is "eternal and inviolate."122 This is a stronger
statement than analogous provisions in almost any other industrialized
country. 123 Later labor legislation regulates union-management rela-
tionships--the Labor Relations Adjustment Act of 1946124 and the
Trade Union Law of 1949 12 5-and protects the welfare of individual
117 T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 34-46. A company may use ceremonies, id at 34-40, daily
recitations, PASCALE & ATHOS, supra note 3, at 73, or songs, H. KAHN, THE EMERGING JAPANESE
SUPERSTATE 110 (1970), to indoctrinate employees. For example, the Matsushita Employees
Creed, states:
Progress and development can be realized only through the combined efforts and cooperation
of each member of our Company. Each of us, therefore, shall keep this idea constantly in
mind as we devote ourselves to the continuous improvement of our Company.
PASCALE & ATHOS, supra note 3, at 75.
118 See T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 28.
119 PASCALE & ATHOS, supra note 3, at 81, 83 (regarding Matsushita).
120 Takeuchi, supra note 4, at 11. Praise, in various forms, seems to be the most effective re-
ward in Japan, perhaps because it implicitly honors those who have fulfilled girl or on. Id
121 KENPO (CONSTITUTION), ART. XXVIII (JAPAN), reprinted in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN,
supra note 111, at app. 2A-9.
122 Id art. XI, at app. 2A-4.
123 T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 73.
124 Law No. 25 of Sept. 27, 1946 (Japan) (amended), reprinted in MINISTRY OF LABOR, JAPAN
LABOUR LAWS 29-37 (1968).
125 Law No. 174 of June 1, 1949 (Japan) (amended), reprinted in id at 15-28. This legislation
together with the Labor Relations Adjustment Law, regulate union formation, bargaining proce-
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employees-the Labor Standards Act.'26 Although the Japanese have
a Labor Relations Commission somewhat akin to the National Labor
Relations Board, it is staffed by appointed part-time commissioners
representing the public, labor, and employers in equal numbers. 27
Rather than adjudicate as the Board does, the Commission's job is to
conciliate, mediate and arbitrate, in descending order of importance.'28
One might expect this legal framework to support strong, independent
Japanese trade unions. In reality, however, Japanese unions are weak
compared to American counterparts, and Japanese law, though
modeled after United States law, is interpreted very differently.
129
More than ninety-one percent of all Japanese union members be-
longed to enterprise unions in 1975,130 whereas most United States
dure, unfair labor practices and disputes. Id They are the Japanese equivalent of the U.S. Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Unlike the NLRA, the Japanese statutes contain no provisions which
hold unions to a standard of fair labor practice. 6 DOING BusiNEss IN JAPAN, supra note I 1, at
pt. XII § 1.02[2].
126 Law No. 49 of Apr. 7, 1947 (Japan) (amended), reprinted in JAPAN LABOUR LAWS, Supra
note 124, at 61-106. This statute has four major features: 1) guarantees minimal working condi-
tions-hours, vacations, accident compensation, safety and hygiene (chs. I, III-X); 2) regulates the
terms of individual employment contracts, i.e. causes for discharge (ch. II); 3) eliminates exploita-
tive labor practices by intermediary labor brokers (ch. I, art. 6); and 4) provides administrative
enforcement (chs. XI-XIII). This statute is a critical piece of legislation in this area and is supple-
mented by several other statutes, administrative orders and judicial decisions, which protect labor.
6 DoING BUsINESs IN JAPAN, supra note I 11, pt. XII § 1.01[3][a].
127 See T. HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 142 (1979).
128 See T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 205.
129 The Trade Union Law's purpose was "to elevate the status of workers .. , [to] equalize
standing with their employer [sic]." Law No. 174, supra note 125, art. 1. This goal, however, has
not yet been achieved. 6 DoING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 111, at pt. XII, § 1.01[1]. Japa-
nese Marxist labor law scholars put a great deal of emphasis on this principle and on Article 28 of
the Japanese Constitution. Although some courts have adopted a literal interpretation, others
refuse and instead balance labors' rights against other constitutional rights, notably an employer's
private property rights. D. HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 120-21. See also supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
130 See T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 89. An enterprise union is composed of blue and white
collar employees below the level of full supervisory status at a single work location. D. HENDER-
SON, supra note 64, at 117. Although enterprise unions in large companies may have branch
organizations at each of the company's several work sites, each branch acts independently and so
should be considered as a separate union. T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 88. Approximately 36%
of the Japanese work force belongs to enterprise unions, whereas craft and industrial unions repre-
sent only 6.9%. Id
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union members are affiliated with trade unions. 1 31 Loose nationwide
federations of enterprise unions exist in Japan, but they have only advi-
sory functions.132 Japan's major labor legislation, enacted during the
post-war American occupation, 13 3 caused considerable union growth
Number of Unions and Union Members According to the Type of Union Organization
Type of Union No. of Unions % No. of Union %
Organization Members
Enterprise 65,337 94.2 11,361,378 91.1
Craft 720 1.0 169,569 1.4
Industrial 1,775 2.6 682,728 5.5
Others 1,501 2.2 259,299 2.0
Totals 69,333 100.0 12,472,974 100.0
Source: Ministry of Labor, Basic Survey of Trade Unions (1977), reprinted in T. HANAMI,
supra note 74, at 8.
Unionism is concentrated in larger companies because smaller ones have such tenuous finances
that a union would result in the employers' bankruptcy. D. HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 117.
Number of Unions and Members According to the Size of the Enterprise in Private Sector
(1977)






Source: Ministry of Labor, Basic Survey of Trade Unions (1977), reprinted in T. HANAMI, supra
note 74, at 90.
131 Table 7, Membership of Four Largest Unions in 1974 and of Four Unions with Largest In-
crease in Membershp 1964-1974, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) B-5 (Aug. 12, 1975), as cited in B.
MELTZER, LABOR LAW 51 (1977).
132 The three major national federations, Sohyo, Domei and Chtlritsu Raren, perform two
functions. They coordinate annual tactical labor activity, the "spring offensive," to pressure em-
ployers to agree to standard wage increases. Their other principle concern is national politics. D.
HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 119. See also K. YAKABE, LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN 31-33
(1974). Sahyo espouses Marxist philosophy, which affects enterprise union practices to some ex-
tent when dispute activity is used as a bargaining tactic. Levine, Postwar Trade Unionism, Collec-
tive Bargaining, and Japanese Social Structure, in ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
JAPAN 267-70 (R. Dore ed. 1967). The federations, however, are considered "outsiders" by both
enterprise unions and management; consequently, they are not welcome at the bargaining table.
Id at 263. See also supra note 106 and infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text. Thus, there is a
split in the Japanese labor movement between business unionism at the local level and predomi-
nantly political unionism at the national level R. EVANS, THE LABOR ECONOMIES OF JAPAN AND
THE UNITED STATES 256 (1971). See also Ishikawa, The Regulation of the Employer-Employee
Relationshp: Japanese Labor-Relations Law, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 58, at 439, 442-44.
133 S. LEVINE, INDUSTRiAL RELATIONS IN POSTwAR JAPAN 21-30 (1958).
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from 1945-49.134 Workers were then urgently concerned with basic
survival and so labor organization proceeded as expediently as possi-
ble, on an enterprise rather than a national basis.135 This pattern also
accommodated traditional Japanese social structure. 136 The lifetime
employment system also developed in response to post-war economic
instability.137 It reinforces enterprise-based labor organization because
a worker's concern centers on his own company rather than on his
trade's position in the industry at large. 138
Enterprise unionism also encourages worker dependence. Al-
though the Japanese law forbids employer interference and domina-
tion,139 companies routinely provide their unions with office space,
furniture, secretarial help and paid release time for union leaders, al of
which would be considered unlawful support under the NLRA. 140
Corporate paternalism is thereby extended to unions as well as to indi-
vidual employees. 1 ' Unions consequently have an ambiguous role to
play, cooperating with management on the one hand, yet maintaining
enough independence to serve members' interests when those interests
differ from management's.142 Although labor and management enjoy
cooperative relations and share equivalent fringe benefits, as well as the
same lunchrooms, washrooms, uniforms and parking facilities, both
workers and management remain aware of their respective status.
143
Workers rarely express grievances openly, but instead assume that
management will intuitively perceive their discontent and solve the
134 Ishikawa, supra note 132, at 440-41.
135 D. HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 117.
136 Id at 117-19.
137 K. OKOCHI, B. KARSH & S. LEVINE, WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS IN JAPAN 57, 63 (1974).
The postwar Japanese labor movement was primarily concerned with protecting workers from the
economic confusion which followed Japan's defeat. Unions supported the lifetime employment
system as one means to this end. Unless postwar employers were under extreme economic pres-
sure, they would not dismiss employees because of the fierce union opposition which would inevi-
tably follow.
138 T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 89. See also SASAKI, supra note 49, at 31-32.
139 Law No. 174, supra note 125, at art. 7(3).
140 Compare id, which expressly allows employers to provide office space, with Wagner Act,
supra note 14, at § 8(a)(2) and infra notes 211-30 and accompanying text (illegal support under
§ 8(a)(2)). Additional kinds of employer assistance do not violate the Trade Unions Law as inter-
preted. See T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 184. In fact, once a company provides office space, it
cannot withhold it without cause. 6 DoINo BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 111, at pt. XII
§ 1.02[3][a].
141 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
142 T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 176, 186. A union leader's speech to new employees reveals
the divided loyalty of enterprise unions. Id at 179-81. See also T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 61.
143 T. HANAMi, supra note 74, at 46.
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problem. 144 A direct complaint would be a rude assertion that the su-
pervisor was not living up to his moral iri obligation, thereby causing
both him and the grievant to lose face.'
4 -
In addition, negotiated labor agreements, like other Japanese busi-
ness contracts, are vague and usually have no terms specific enough to
form the basis for complaint. 1" Written contracts, if they exist, are
general, often just repeating legislative requirements. 47 Planning for
potential problems is embodied in a consultation provision rather than
in a detailed, adjudicatory grievance procedure common to United
States labor agreements. 148 Even in the bargaining process itself, de-
mands regarding wage increases or working conditions are considered
unethical because they are tactless and indelicate.149 Unions do con-
front management with wage demands, but both parties understand
that this is a ritual, face-saving device to demonstrate the union's inde-
pendence from management. 5 Actual negotiations on a contested is-
sue would be very uncomfortable, because the parties are accustomed
to warm, cooperative relations.' 51 In sum, Japanese labor unions do
not conduct true bargaining sessions in the American sense. Employers
and employees rely on bonds of trust and interdependence, not on de-
finitive contract terms.'
52
Labor-management issues are handled by daily liason between
union and firm officials on all levels of plant and office. 153  It is only
after this process breaks down, that the legal inadequacies of the Japa-
nese system become painfully apparent in a hostile confrontation.
54
This potential for slowdowns, demonstrations, strikes and violence sur-
prises most Americans, who have rosy preconceptions about Japanese
144 Id
145 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
146 T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 52.
147 Levine, supra note 132, at 274. See also J. ABEGGLEN, supra note 73, at 148.
148 Levine, supra note 132, at 274.
149 T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 45.
150 Levine, supra note 132, at 265-66. See also T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 176, 186; J. ABEG-
GLEN, supra note 73, at 34.
151 D. HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 126.
152 T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 178. Law No. 49, supra note 126, at arts. 89-93, requires
employers to establish rules of work and these rules, together with subjects of other protective
legislation, take the place of what would be provisions in U.S. collective bargaining agreements.
Further, there are no mandatory bargaining matters in Japan as there are in the United States. 6
DOING BusNEss N JAPAN, supra note Ill, at pt. XII, § 1.02[4][B][iii].
153 D. HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 125. See also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
Within business circles, a strike is blamed on management for they have evidently failed to run a
"good house." T. ROHLEN, supra note 50, at 189.
154 D. HENDERSON, supra note 64, at 125.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:585(1983)
labor relations. 55 In 1975, there were 8,860 strikes in Japan, compared
to 5,031 in the United States.156 Their frequency is a product of their
function. Most often they are ritual posturing in the "bargaining" pro-
cess itself, but if agreement cannot be reached through the services of
go-betweens working behind the scenes, the confrontation may esca-
late.'5 7 Disputes may also erupt if the usual labor-management consul-
tation process fails to remedy serious worker discontent.'58 A strike in
the United States, on the other hand, usually serves as a calculated
technique to hasten an end. For the Japanese, strikes, albeit short ones,
are a tool of first rather than last resort.159
155 T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 130.
156 Trend of Labor Disputes in Six Major Countries, SEISANSEI HONBU (Japan Productivity
Center), KATsUJO ROO TOKEi (Practical Labor Statistics) (table, 1977), at 159; Number of Strikes
in Japan, MINISTRY OF LABOR, RODO SOGi ToKEI CHOSA NEN HOKOKU [Annual Report of Sta-
tistics and Survey of Labor Disputes] (table 1976), reprinted in T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 148-
49. The average union member who struck during 1968, however, lost 2.4 work days in Japan and
18.5 days in the United States. R. EVANS, supra note 132, at 28, 30. The low liquidity, high
leverage financial structure which is characteristic of Japanese businesses would not be possible if
unions were prone to extended strikes. R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN
JAPAN 39-40 (1976). See also J. ABEGGLEN, supra note 73, at 36-37.
157 They include short strikes by designated employees or by all employees at planned inter-
vals, withholding company proceeds, picketing which physically barricades company premises,
sitdown strikes, mutinous factory takeovers, Ishikawa, supra note 132, at 448-53, and covering a
company building with crude, name-calling posters, T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 128. Although
violence is statutorily proscribed, courts have been reluctant to rule against unions when violence
occurs. See Ishikawa, supra note 132, at 452, 453. See also T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 73-79.
The Japanese Constitution guarantees employees the right to engage in concerted activity. See
supra note 121. The Trade Union Law forbids employers from penalizing participants and also
exempts "appropriate" union actions from civil and criminal liability. Law No. 174, supra note
125, arts. 1, 7, & 8. Much of Japanese labor law concerns the legality of various union dispute
tactics. See 6 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 111, at pt. XII § 1.02[6].
Japanese dispute techniques have serious practical and legal disadvantages from a union's
point of view. Long strikes rarely occur because enterprise unions, which typically charge only
nominal dues since their employers pay for most expenses, have no funds to compensate their
members for lost wages. T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 158. Management can easily find strike
breakers from Japan's reservoir of temporary workers because, unlike in the United States, substi-
tute workers have no union loyalties before becoming employees of a company. Ishikawa, supra
note 132, at 455. Management may also undermine union activity by supporting dissident mem-
bers in the formation of a break-away union or by firing militant union leaders despite laws which
forbid this. Id at 455. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
158 See T. ROHLEN, supra note 50. Rohlen's study of a Japanese bank disclosed that workers
there complained about many of the same problems one would expect of employees anywhere:
incompetent supervisors, inadequate appreciation and low pay. Id. at 178-79. Rarely do disputes
arise over contract interpretation. See Levine, supra note 132, at 275. See also supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
159 Evans explains that although U.S. strikes are tactical maneuvers rather than ultimate solu-
tions, the Japanese resort to them much more quickly. R. EVANS, supra note 132, at 30. But cf. T.
HANAMI, supra note 74, at 149-50 (the difference between the use of strikes in Japan and the
United States is more than a matter of degree).
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Problems which are not settled by employer appeals for union co-
operation or by punitive retaliation are usually resolved by a Labor
Relations Commissioner acting as a conciliator. 160 Agreement is
reached by "let[ting] the dispute flow to the water," '161 by allowing hos-
tility to naturally dissipate and accepting the third party's sugges-
tions. 162 Pushing the responsibility onto an authority allows both sides
to compromise without losing face. Parties may also bring their case to
the Commission as a whole or to the civil courts, instead of submitting
it to negotiation. 163 Judgments there are based on intuitive assessments
of what result both sides will accept rather than on objective legal stan-
dards. These decisions, however, are largely ineffective."
Ineffectiveness comes in large part from delay.' 65 If, for example,
a dismissed union leader is reinstated pursuant to a long-delayed court
order, he will probably face hostility from most fellow workers who
prefer to forget past labor-management contention.'66 The union
leader, as a symbol of conflict, is unwelcome, because the Japanese
preference for harmonious relationships is so strong. 167 Viewed as a
heretic, social pressure typically forces the former leader to resign his
job. 168 Thus, unions resort to the Commission or to the courts only as a
final effort when dispute action, negotiations and conciliation have
failed.
Although Japanese labor law was adopted from the West, in prac-
tice the Japanese labor relations system still relies on traditional social
mores to ensure harmony.'69 Cultural norms, however, are rl-suited to
accommodate authentic differences between labor and management in-
terests, so disputes become emotional, uncontrolled struggles. This
contrasts with the United States' system, which assumes from the be-
160 See T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 204-06.
161 Id at 203.
162 Id In 1976, 96% of the Commission's 1,528 cases were settled by conciliation, three percent
by mediation, and one percent by arbitration, indicating a strong preference for the least adjudica-
tory means available. Id at 206. See also supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
163 See 6 DOING BusINEss IN JAPAN, supra note 111, at pt. XII § 1.02[2][e]. See also T.
HANAMI, supra note 74, at 205-22 (especially his interpretation of union use of the courtroom as a
stage for further dispute activity).
164 Koichiro Yamaguchi, Rolt Saiban no Kyaklckan Sei (The Objectiveness of Legal Judgment on
Labor Cases), 487 Jurist 29 (1971), quoted in T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 220-21. See also supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
165 The average length of time required to process an unfair labor practice case was 635 days in
1976. T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 215.
166 See id at 215-16.
167 See id
168 Idj
169 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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ginning that labor and management are adversaries. Consequently,
most United States labor law focuses on controlling and rationalizing
labor disputes through collective bargaining, contractual grievance pro-
cedures, arbitration, the Board and the courts. Thus, a central difficulty
of implementing Japanese-style labor relations in the United States is
to reconcile its major feature, labor-management cooperation, with a
system premised on labor-management antagonism.
III. JAPANESE INFLUENCE AND UNITED STATES LABOR LAW
A. Theory Z, Quality of Worklife and Participative Management
The major features of traditional United States business manage-
ment-scientific or efficiency management-developed when the in-
dustrial work force was largely unskilled, uneducated immigrant
labor. 7 ° In the last decade, however, a number of people from aca-
demic and business circles have begun to question its appropriate-
ness171 in light of the United States work force's increased level of
education, 72 growing white collar employment, declining blue collar
employment, 173 worker discontent, 74 and declining productivity.
75
Management reform experiments have been launched in several
predominantly blue collar industries in attempts to enhance the quality
of work life, encourage participative management, or consciously adopt
elements of Japanese management. 76 More than 200 United States
companies had implemented QC circles by mid-1981,177 including
Lockheed, General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, TRW, 3M Com-
170 NORTON, supra note 88, at 483. See also supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
171 Angel, Professionals and Unionization, 66 MINN. L. REv. 383, 388-405 (1982).
172 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 136 (table no. 216, Years of School Completed, by Race: 1940 to 1976 (1977)). In
1940, 61.9% of persons aged 25-29 had not completed high school; in 1976, only 15.3% of the
population in that age group had not graduated.
173 Leon, Occupation Winners and Losers: Who They Were During 1972-80, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., June 1982, at 18. Analysis of the Current Population Survey found that a majority of the 20
fastest growing occupations were in professional or clerical fields. Id at 19. The blue collar cate-
gory contained seven of the 10 biggest losers. Id at 26.
174 Ingrassia, Union Rank and File Talk Bittery of Their Bosses, Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1982, at
22, col. 3. See also Cooper, Morgan, Foley & Kaplan, Changing Employee Values: Deepening
Discontent?, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 117 [hereinafter cited as Cooper].
175 Manufacturing and Industry Productivity, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 111, at 55 (Sept. 20,
1982).
176 See generally MANAGEMENT BY JAPANESE SYSTEMS, supra note 3 (38 readings about Japa-
nese management practices used in the United States). See also Landrum, Experiments with
Worker Participation in the United States, paper submitted to the International Labour Organiza-
tion's Symposium on Workers' Participation Within Undertakings (The Hague, May 1981) (pub-
lished by the International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland).
177 See supra note 97.
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pany and Lincoln National Life Insurance Company.1 78 American sub-
sidiaries of Japanese companies-Hitachi, Sanyo-have also imported
the technique. 179 Motorola instituted a Participative Management Pro-
gram which emphasizes employee participation, communication and
trust as means of improving product quality and plant productivity.
18 0
Westinghouse Corporation hired a consultant to counsel them on adop-
tion of Theory Z management methods, which stress employee sugges-
tions, quality control and consensus rather than autocratic
decisionmaking. 81 Delta Airlines' largely non-union staff, numbering
37,000, has been treated like family since the company's founding in
the 1920s.182 Delta's slogan, "All airlines are the same; only people
make the difference," is put into practice by a policy of lifetime job
security, promotion from within, open door management, help for em-
ployees who encounter personal problems, active solicitation of em-
ployee opinions, and an emphasis on high quality customer service.
1 8 1
Quality of worklife programs, centered on joint management-labor
problem solving groups, have been established by contract provision at
Harmon Industries International in Bolivar, Tennessee,"s and General
Motor's Tarrytown, Pennsylvania, and Livonia, Michigan, plants.
18 1
Other United Auto Worker (UAW) contracts with General Motors and
Ford include provisions for experimental lifetime employment systems
at six plants.1 8 6 Local labor-management committees and a national
council to study and recommend ideas for industry development and
178 Takeuchi, supra note 4, at 14-17.
179 Id
180 Motorola Inc., The Partiepative Management Program (1983) (pamphlet available from
Motorola, Communications Sector, Schaumburg, Il.). See also Motorola's Lessons for Industry,
Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 28, 1982, at 37, col. 1.
181 Burck, Westinghouse'r Cultural Revolution, FORTUNE, June 15, 1981, at 74.
182 See Delta Soars to Top in Sky by Keeping Employees Happy, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Oct.
14, 1981 [hereinafter cited as Delta Soars]; Delta Airlines Today, at 3, 6 (unpublished paper sup-
plied by public relations department of Delta Airlines, Inc., Atlanta, Ga.); Rock, Company Sweet
Company, BusINEss ATLANTA, Nov. 1980, at 40-41. "W. Thomas Beeke, Delta's board chairman,
carefully cultivates worker loyalty by taking care of employees through company policy as if they
were his own treasured offspring." Id.
183 See Delta Soars, supra note 182; Rock, supra note 182, at 41; Personnel Deltar' People Divi-
sion, DELTA DIGEST, July 1971, at 15; Delta Airlines Today, supra note 182. See also PASCALE &
ATHos, supra note 3, at 287-89.
184 Macy, The Quality of Work/dfe Project at Bolivar: An Assessment, MoNTHLY LAB. REv.,
July 1980, at 41. See also Bluestone, Creating a New World of Work, 115 INTL LAB. REv. 1
(1977).
185 Guest, supra note 8 (reports a virtual turn-around by what had been one of GM's most
troublesome, least efficient plants).
186 GeneralMotors- UAWContract Settlement, LAB. RE1. REP. (BNA) No. 109, at 264 (Mar. 29,
1982).
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worker training will be established. 187 According to a UAW spokesper-
son, these committees, foreshadowed by a 1973 UAW-GM contract
provision, ls 8 were "created out of recognition that areas once thought
the responsibility of one party are actually of mutual concern."' 18 9 At
Ford's Mount Clemens, Michigan, plant, management and workers
have begun a year-long job training project in an effort to improve
communications between the two groups. 190
Labor-management cooperation presents legal problems for both
union and non-union shops. In union shops the existing contract will
probably prevent cross training, unencumbered employee transfers,
19
merit increases, 192 and resolution of grievances outside the formal pro-
cess delineated. 193 Furthermore, the NLRA decrees that a certified
union' 94 is the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees.
95
It is unlawful for any other group to "deal. . .with employers con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, or conditions of work."196 If labor-management cooperation
circumvents usual union channels, a contract violation or an unfair la-
bor practice may result. 97 This explains why labor-management com-
mittees, blue collar-white collar experiments, or other attempts to build
187 Id; Nationwide Impact ofFord-UAWAgreement, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 110, at 145
(1982); Historic New Ford-UA W Contract, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 109, at 141 (1982).
188 Quality of Worklife Programs at General Motors, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS
AND CONTRACTS (BNA) No. 16, at 921 (Feb. 7, 1980).
189 General Motors- UAW Contract Settlement, supra note 185. Cf. Frederick Taylor's scientific
management theory which recommended strict separation of labor and management responsibili-
ties. C. GEORGE, supra note 87, at 92. But see Participative Management, WHAT's NEW IN COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) No. 974, at 4 (Sept. 30, 1982)
(labeling these new management approaches as superficial publicity campaigns, or marriages of
convenience, to which auto and steel unions must agree because of their industries' abysmal per-
formance. The authors also observe that these unions acquiesce to maintain "statesman-like
images" because they have no hope of making any real gains at the bargaining table. "To the
extent that meaningful influence, authority, and a share of ensuing profits are withheld in partici-
pative management schemes, such experiments may be rightly viewed by labor as shams.").
190 In Brief, WHAT's NEW IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS
(BNA) No. 973, at 3 (Sept. 16, 1982).
191 See supra note 108.
192 B. MELTZER, supra note 74, at 163.
193 See id at 161 (grievances and arbitration provision).
194 NLRA, supra note 14, at § 9(e), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1976) (a certified labor union is one
which wins a majority of employee votes in a Board-supervised and -approved election).
195 Id at § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). Japanese labor law does not confer exclusive status
on any employee organization, 6 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 111, at pt. XII
§ 1.02[4][a], so unions do not have a monopoly on employee-employer communication.
196 NLRA, supra note 14, at § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976).
197 Id at § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), which provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."
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more Japanese-like work relationships in union shops must be written
into negotiated agreements. 198 Although some unions have adopted
this trend, others view it as a threatening employer tactic designed to
weaken unions by fostering a closer relationship directly between labor
and management without union intermediaries. 199 The legal conse-
quences of implementing Japanese-style, cooperative labor relations in
union shops will vary depending on the attitudes of union leaders, as
reflected in the terms of each bargaining contract.
Although no contract barriers to Japanese-style labor relations ex-
ist in non-union shops, a provision of the NLRA may still prevent em-
ployers from forming labor-management committees if those
committees discuss wages, hours or working conditions. A group
which engages in these activities is defined as a labor organization
under the statute,200 and the law requires labor organizations to be free
of employer domination, interference and financial support." 1 Thus,
the Board and the courts have consistently declared employee organi-
zations that resemble Japanese enterprise unions unlawful.20 2 The rea-
sons for this depend on the history of the United States labor
movement and on the assumptions about employer-employee relations
which persist in United States labor law.
B. United States Labor Policy
L History and the NLAA4
Decades of violent strife between workers and management 2°3 mo-
tivated Congress to pass the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of
198 See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
199 What's In It For Unions?, FORTUNE, Aug. 24, 1981, at 88 (reporting that the United Steel-
worker's 1980 contract required department-level labor-management participation teams to avoid
discussing bargaining and grievance issues). But see Workplace Democracy and Industrial Policy,
LAB. R.EL. REP. (BNA) No. 110, at 171 (June 28, 1982) (regarding failure of USW program).
AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Thomas R. Donahue expressed distrust of quality of worklife pro-
grams saying that they may be another employer attempt to bypass or supplant the union. Quality
of Worklpfe Programs, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 109, at 94 (Feb. 1982). Employers, he stated,
may try "101 ways to make cosmetic changes that try to fool the worker into believing that it's a
great place to work and that management really cares, despite the lousy pay and rotten condi-
tions." Id Conceding some benefits, he advised that such employer proposals should be
"watched very carefully" because they are often just devices, promoted by managements bargain-
ing consultants, designed to break unions. Id
200 See supra note 195.
201 See supra note 14.
202 See infra notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
203 Norton, supra note 88, at 486-90, 581, 726 & 737-40. See also MORISON, SU.ra note 88, at
376-83; D. MILTON, THE POLnCs OF U.S. LABOR HISTORY (1982).
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1935 (NLRA),2 04 labor's bill of rights.20 5 Its primary purpose was to
give employees an effective voice in the work place through collective
bargaining.0 6 Because collective bargaining was recognized by the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1934, many employers sponsored
formation of single-firm employee organizations in an attempt to sub-
vert independent trade unions' organizing efforts. 207 By 1935, 2.5 mil-
lion employees belonged to so-called company unions.208  Because
these unaffiliated groups had inadequate financial support and de-
pended on management's good opinion for their existence, their role in
collective bargaining was described as a "colloquy between one side [of
the employer's] mouth and the other."20 9 "Company union" became a
pejorative term in the labor movement 10 and that viewpoint is re-
flected in the legislative history of the NLRA. The bill's sponsor, Sena-
tor Wagner, intended to outlaw these sham unions, but did not intend
to make other forms of independent, enterprise-based labor organiza-
tions illegal.2 1
Despite Senator Wagner's intent, protection of employee free
choice became synonymous with selection of trade union representa-
tion.2 12 The NLRA and its interpretations embody an assumption that
only trade unions can be trusted to vigorously pursue employee inter-
ests without employer coercion. That conclusion almost automatically
204 NLRA, supra note 14.
205 B. MELTZER, supra note 131, at 1-11, 31-32.
206 Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfu#vlledPromise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29,34
(1979).
207 Jackson,An Alternative to Unionization and the Wholly Unorganized Shop: .4 Legal Basisfor
Sanctioning Joint Employer Employee Committees and Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 809, 820 (1977).
208 Summers, supra note 206, at 33.
209 R. BROOKS, UNIONS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING 68-69 (1939).
210 See id at 69, 135.
211 The erroneous impression that the bill expresses a bias for some particular form of union
organization probably arises because it outlaws the company dominated union. Let me em-
phasize that nothing in the measure discourages employees from uniting on an independent-
or company-union basis, if by these terms we mean simply an organization confined to the
limits of one plant or one employer. Nothing in the bill prevents employers from maintaining
free and direct relations with their workers .... The only prohibition is against the sham or
dummy union which is dominated by the employer, which is supported by the employer,
which cannot change its rules and regulations without his consent, and which cannot live
except by the grace of the employer's whims.
79 CONG. REc. 2371-72 (Feb. 21, 1935). Although the employer respondent in NLRB v. Cabot
Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959), and later scholarly analysis of the Taft-Hartley Act's legislative
history supported a more tolerant treatment of atypical employer-employee committees, the
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and continued to construe the Act against such forms
of employee representation. Feldman & Steinberg, Employee-Management Committees and the
Labor Management Act of 1947, 35 TUL. L. Rav. 365, 385 (1961).
212 Feldman & Steinberg, supra note 211. See also NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938) (disapproving company unions).
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posits an adversary relationship. Because Japanese-style labor rela-
tions depend on cooperation, rather than antagonism, implementation
of Japanese methods in the United States is legally suspect.213
2 Domination, Cooperation and NLR,4 Section 8(a)(2)
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits em-
ployers from interfering with, dominating or supporting any labor or-
ganization.214 The National Labor Relations Board has construed this
provision very broadly and ordered disestablishment of most non-
traditional employee organizations which exist for the purpose of
"dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rate of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work"'215 if there is
any suggestion of employee support.216 These organizations, typically
called employee committees, are usually formed at the suggestion of
the employer, who may be motivated either by fear of possible trade
union organizing or by a desire for a cooperative mechanism through
which the work environment can be improved.217 Such committees are
loosely organized groups of employee representatives which discuss
wages, hours, safety, grievances, recreation and other conditions of em-
ployment with their respective employers. 218 Usually, management
participates in these committees to a much greater extent than they
would if employees were represented by a trade union.219 Management
may appoint members to the committee itself, meet with the committee
frequently and informally to hear its concerns, or may directly assist its
operations.220  Because employee committees are the closest United
States parallel to Japanese enterprise unions,, their legal record may
predict the consequences of implementing some aspects of Japanese la-
bor relations in the United States.
The Board and the courts have treated employee committees
harshly, construing seemingly innocent forms of support to be illegal
employer domination or interference. Detrimental support is pre-
sumed whether an employer offers secretarial assistance,"' provides re-
213 Ross, Labo; Organizations and the Labor Movement in Advanced Industrial Society, 50 VA.
L. REv. 1359 (1964).
214 NLRA, supra note 14.
215 NLRA, supra note 14, at § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976).
216 See infra notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
217 Jackson, supra note 207, at 810-11.




221 NLRB v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 419 F.2d 1080 (lst Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1023
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freshments2 22 or a mimeograph machine, 223 suggests the idea of an
employee committee,224 participates as a member,2 25 or grants office
space or pay to facilitate meetings.226 Although the Board ostensibly
evaluates the facts of each situation,227 two commentators have con-
cluded that it actually applies a per se rule that automatically assumes
coercion of employees' free choice whenever the requisite degree of
employer support is evidenced.228 The Supreme Court upheld this per
se approach in NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. ,229 and ordered dissolution of an employer-facilitated employee
committee which had been in existence for ten years and which the
employees clearly preferred to union representations:
In applying the statutory test of independence it is immaterial that the
plan had in fact not engendered, or indeed had obviated, serious labor
disputes in the past, or that any company interference in the administra-
tion of the plan had been incidental rather than fundamental and with
good motives. It was for Congress to determine whether, as a matter of
policy, such a plan should be permitted to continue in force. We think
the statute plainly evinces a contrary purpose, and that the Board's con-
clusions are in accord with that purpose. 
30
Since Newport News, the circuit courts and the Board have, with few
exceptions,231 applied the Section 8(a)(2) per se rule to employer-sup-
ported unions whether or not actual employer domination, interference
or coercive financial support was evident.232
(1970) (employer-employee committee ordered to be disestablished after 46 years because com-
pany supplied operating funds, space, secretarial assistance and supplies). See also NLRB v.
Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1964) (employee committee membership elec-
tion unlawfully assisted by employer who printed, distributed and tabulated ballots, though no
unfairness evidenced).
222 Standard Transformer Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 669, 671 (1951).
223 Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1170 (1955).
224 Hertzka & Knowles, 206 N.L.R.B. 191, 196 (1973), enfmnt denied inpart, 503 F.2d 625 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
225 Id See also NLRB v. Northeastern University, 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979). Cf. supra
note 140 and accompanying text (legality of analogous situations in Japan).
226 Dennison Mfg., 419 F.2d at 1080.
227 "It is an oversimplification to assert that the examples enumerated in the text outline the
parameters of section 8(a)(2). In fact, the parameters are unknown, because the Board declines to
make clear the precise type or amount of assistance needed to trigger a violation. mT1he Board
maintains that it does not view individual actions, but instead considers the 'totality' of a situation
.... The Board's long record with § 8(a)(2) cases, however, indicates a low level of tolerance for
such assistance." Note, supra note 217, at 512-13, n.25.
228 Jackson, supra note 207, at 814-18.
229 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
230 Id at 251.
231 See infra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
232 Actual employer domination or interference evident: Classic Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 667
F.2d 205 (1st Cir. 1981); Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958); Randall A.
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Analysis of recent cases suggest two legal distinctions by which an
employee committee need not fall within the broad definition of a labor
organization and thereby can avoid Section 8(a)(2) problems.233 First,
although a non-union employee group is formed to deal with the em-
ployer concerning wages, hours and working conditions, its members
must also be representatives of other employees in order to come within
the NLRA definition.234 Thus, ad hoc committees composed of volun-
teers,235 labor-management work teams,236 and all employee meet-
ings2 7 were lawful because the employees involved represented no one
but themselves. The second exception applies to groups to which man-
agement delegated complete authority over a given task. Since such a
group did not have to consult with management, the Board reasoned
that it was not "dealing with [an] employer" and therefore was not act-
ing as a labor organization under the NLRA definition.238 If an em-
ployer carefully tiptoes along the margins of the NLRA and correctly
structures a labor-management team, the group can avoid legal con-
demnation regardless of its purpose or the amount of employer support
it receives.
These non-representational or complete delegation approaches are
constrained and unsatisfactory ways of legalizing Japanese-style labor
management practices for several reasons. First, employees may prefer
to elect representatives to cooperative committees, fellow workers in
whom they have confidence, rather than have to attend themselves.
Thus, the exception for non-representative employee committees still
denies employees the free choice which was supposedly assured by the
NLRA.23 9 Second, in a delegated problem solving group, consultation
between labor and management could likely be a desirable means of
ensuring that the group's decision was fully informed and useful.2u 0 Fi-
nally, both of these distinctions avoid the increasingly tough question
Wheeler, 260 N.L.R.B. 867 (1981); K & E Bus Lines, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1981); Walker Die
Casting, Inc. 255 N.L.R.B. 212 (1981). No actual employer domination or interference evident:
NLRB v. Reed Rolled Thread Die Co., 432 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
168 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1967), enfd, 419 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1023 (1970);
NLRB v. Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 803, 809-12 (1st Cir. 1964); Wyman-Gordon Co. v.
NLRB, 153 F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1946).
233 Schurgin, The Limits of Organized Employer-Employee Relations in Non-Union Facilities:
Some New Evidence of Flexibility, 57 Cm. [-] KENrr L. Rnv. 615 (1981).
234 See supra note 196.
235 Fiber Materials, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 933 (1977).
236 General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
237 Avildson Tools & Machine, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1955).
238 St. Vincent Hospital, 244 N.L.R.B. 84 (1979).
239 See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
240 See Ingami & Nakamura, supra note 96, at 2.
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of why, given the maturity of the American labor movement and sup-
posed statutory neutrality, traditional collective bargaining must be the
only means under the NLRA through which labor may deal with
management.
Another line of cases using an "actual domination" test24' gives
both labor and management more flexibility in structuring their rela-
tionship as they choose. This test irregularly appears in three circuits
and attempts to distinguish detrimental support from cooperation,
thereby allowing some non-union employee committees. In Chicago
Rawhide v. NLRB the Seventh Circuit stated:
Support, even though innocent, can be identified because it constitutes at
least some degree of control or influence .... The test of whether an
organization is employer controlled is not an objective one but rather sub-
jective from the standpoint of the employees .... [T]he Board may not
infer conduct that is violative of the Act from conduct that is not ....
We are not going to permit the destruction of a happy and cooperative
employer-employee relationship when there is absolutely no evidence to
support a finding of an unfair labor practice.2
42
Chicago Rawhide's cooperation standard significantly expanded the
permissible extent of employer involvement. The employer assisted in
forming an employee's committee, allowed it to meet during working
hours on company premises, and contributed money to a related em-
ployee recreation fund.24 3 The complaint was filed by a union which
had badly lost a recent bargaining election.2 " In allowing the em-
ployee committee, however, the court formulated no principles by
which the line between illegal support and acceptable cooperation
could be identified. The standard remained vague, an issue of fact and
intuition. The First Circuit, nonetheless, adopted it in Coppus Engi-
neering Corporation v. NLRB, z45 finding that the employer-initiated
employee grievance committee was not a "creature of management
. . . which functioned in subservience. . . contrary to sec. 8(a)(1) and
(2)."4
Two recent decisions which cite the Chicago Rawhide actual domi-
nation test go even further in approving cooperative employer-em-
ployee organizations by explicitly protecting employees' right to choose
between a traditional labor union and a less formal, unaffiliated com-
241 Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1955).
242 Id at 167-68, 170.
243 Id at 166-67.
244 Id at 167.
245 240 F.2d 564 (Ist Cir. 1957).
246 Id at 572.
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mittee which the employer expressly prefers. In Hertzka & Knowles,247
the Ninth Circuit was confronted with an employer-initiated plan of
five topical labor-management committees which had been formed
amidst a union organizing effort.2 48 Denying the union's Section
8(a)(2) suit, the majority opinion stated:
[F]or us to condemn this organization would mark approval of a purely
adversarial model of labor relations. Where a cooperative arrangement
reflects a choice freely arrived at and where the organization is capable of
being a meaningful avenue for the expression of employee wishes, we find
it unobjectionable under the Act.249
More recently, in Northeastern University 25 0 the First Circuit up-
held an organization of non-professional university staff, which pro-
vided for employer involvement, because there was no evidence of
actual domination or interference.251 The opinion characterized the or-
ganization as part of a trend. "[C]hanging conditions in the labor-
management field seem to have strengthened the case for providing
room for cooperative employee-employee arrangements as alternatives
to the traditional adversary model.
252
Since the Hertzka & Knowles and Northeastern University rulings,
it is clear that while the Board favors the traditional methods of pro-
tecting workers, the First, Seventh, and Ninth circuits have at least be-
gun to forego this paternalism in favor of allowing employees the
freedom to choose less adversarial types of organization.253 At this
point, it is difficult to tell from Section 8(a)(2) decisions whether future
interpretations will protect employee free choice or favor traditional
adversary labor unions. Social factors, legislative history, and the po-
tential advantages of Japanese style labor relations support a need for
change in the Board's interpretation of Section 8(a)(2).
3. Rationale for Change
John Simmons of the University of Massachusetts has called for a
"radical shift from adversarial relations," citing a United States worker
grievance rate seventeen times higher than that in European countries
and the lowest rate of productivity increases of all industrialized na-
247 Herazka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 626.
248 Id at 626, n.2.
249 503 F.2d at 631.
250 601 F.2d at 1208.
251 Id at 1216.
252 Id at 1214. See also Angel, supra note 171.
253 See Summers, supra note 206 (tracing the historical debate between those who favor poli-
ies which affirmatively protect trade unions and those who favor a policy of neutrality).
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tions.254 Concurring, Edward L. Cushman, a professor at Wayne State
University and former American Motors executive, commented that
"[1like marital relations, success in labor relations is not found in seek-
ing victory over the other party." '255 According to a United Auto
Workers Union leader, labor management relationships have vastly
improved since the 1940s and good faith is now the predominant char-
acteristic of UAW-GM contract talks:
256
Today substantial numbers of workers no longer have an interest in class
struggle politics. There is a decline in union membership; strikes are
more difficult to maintain; organized labor has made little headway with
white collar employees; the moral fervor that once drove the movement
seems to have died .... To the extent that workers identify more with
management than with traditional unions, and that employers are not in-
terested in subverting the interests of their employees, there is a need to
relax the stringent standard of separation that has developed under sec-
tion 8(a)(2).25 7
Statistical studies support this impression. According to a recent
survey, workers saw union representation as a last resort for solving
problems with management.25 This feeling, plus management's use of
"positive personnel strategy" (unilaterally providing attractive pay and
benefits)259 are two factors contributing to the declining rate of union
254 Workplace Democracy and Industrial Policy, LAB. REL. RaP. (BNA) No. 110, at 171 (June
28, 1982). See also J. SIMMONS, supra note 97.
255 Labor Relations and Callfor Radical Change, 1981 LAB. REL. Y.B. 19, 21.
256 See Quality of Workife Programs at General Motors, supra note 188, at 9.
257 Note, supra note 217, at 5 16-17, 519. Although this author restricts his recommendation to
professional or quasi-professional employees-draftsmen, university staff, nurses-in light of the
Japanese experience, there is no reason for this limit if the guiding principle is worker free choice.
258 Leftwich, Organizing in the Eighties: A Human Perspective, 32 LAB. L.J. 484, 486 (1981).
See also Krislov & Silver, Current Challenges in Industrial Relations, 32 LAB. L.J. 480 (1981).
259 Leftwich, supra note 258. See also Seligman, Who Needs Unions?, FORTUNE, July 12, 1982,
at 54, 66 (stating that U.S. government regulation of the workplace through the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration [OSHA], Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
[ERISA], and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] is an effective competitor
with trade unions). Cf. Law No. 49, supra note 126 and accompanying text, as indicative of the
effect statutory protections have on collective bargaining agreements in Japan.
Regarding personnel strategies, Seligman observes:
Big business takes employee morale seriously these days. Personnel departments are increas-
ingly responding to a "human-relations ideology" that labors to take the rough edges off the
company's dealings with workers. In 30% of all non-union companies, some kind of formal
grievance procedure is now in place. Professor Fred K. Foulkes of the Boston University
School of Management, who has studied the personnel policies of 26 large non-union compa-
nies (20 of which were on the Fortune 500 in 1975), concluded that these companies were in
many ways offering blue-collar workers the best of both worlds. In dealing with pay and
benefit issues, and also in setting the rules by which plants were run, many of the companies
were to a remarkable degree limiting the freedom of their managers "beyond anything that a
union would be able to negotiate." Foulkes observed that the companies had employees
whose attitudes retained "some undefined intangibles that. . . relate to morale, trust, confi-
dence, spirit, good faith, an identification with management, and a consequent avoidance of
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membership. 6 In 1954, nearly thirty-five percent of the American
work force were union members; by 1978 the number had diminished
to less than twenty-four percent.2 6 The decline can also be attributed
to the decreasing blue collar industrial sector of the economy, unions'
traditional stronghold, and to the corresponding increase in white col-
lar, clerical and service employees, whom unions have had less success
attracting.262 This evidence suggests that if employees were given a
truly free choice among various forms of representation, a large pro-
portion of the American work force would welcome the introduction of
Japanese-style labor relations. Another American study of 175,000
hourly employees in 159 companies found that these employees were
increasingly dissatisfied with their work. 63 Many complaints focused
on "esteem related factors" rather than on pay or other tangible bene-
fits.264 These employees consistently stated that they were not treated
the we-they adversary relationship that can so frequently characterize the union-management
relationship.
Seligman, supra, at 66.
260 Participants in a panel discussion on the declining role of U.S. labor unions posited several
other reasons: effective management opposition, ineffective legal deterrents for discriminatory
discharges, shrinking markets for U.S. goods, and the growing popularity of anti-union sentiment.
Are the Unions Dead, or Just Sleeping? FORTUNE, Sept. 20, 1982, at 98, 99-100.
261
Year Union Membership Non-Agricultural Percent Non-Union
(thousands) Employees Members
(thousands)
1954 17,022 49,022 34.7
1955 16,802 50,675 33.2
1960 17,049 54,234 31.4
1965 17,299 60,815 28.4
1970 19,381 70,593 27.5
1975 19,564 76,945 25.4
1978 20,238 85,763 23.6
Source: U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS, BULL. No. 1865, at 389 (1975) (for years 1954 through 1970); Gov'T EMPL.
REL. REP. (BNA), No. 827, at 35 (Sept. 10, 1979) (for years 1975 and 1978).
(Sept. 10, 1979) (for years 1975 and 1978). But see Seligman, supra note 259, at 64 (notes that
these statistics are based on unaudited membership reports from unions to the Department of
Labor, and thus are probably inflated).
262 Angel, supra note 171, at 385.
263 Cooper, supra note 174. But cf Who's Happy Now, FoRBEs, Apr. 25, 1983, at 8 (reports
results from an Indiana University study comparing United States and Japanese worker satisfac-
tion). Contrary to "conventional wisdom," more American than Japanese workers were willing to
work harder (68%, 44%) and even more surprisingly, more Americans than Japanese had family
feelings toward their companies (85%, 36%). Id Although access to the study itself might negate
this speculation, an explanation for these results may be the facts that Japanese workers are al-
ready working very hard, and that their cultural expectations demand much more of employer-
employee relations than Americans and hence are more readily disappointed. Conversely, these
statistics might be evidence that the traditional elements of Japanese culture are diminishing.
264 Cooper, supra note 174, at 123.
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with respect as individuals, that they perceived little opportunity for
advancement or for enrichment of the content of their job assignment,
that the companies did not listen or respond to workers, and that they
were not treated fairly. 265 A parallel survey of managers in the same
companies produced opposite results, showing a definite "hierarchy
gap" between management and labor perceptions of their job satisfac-
tion.2 66 The authors concluded that companies must face these
problems and find solutions, other than the usual pay raises, to make
their work force as effective as possible.26
7
Although the Board and most courts interpret the NLRA in ways
which favor traditional, adversary unions over "weaker" employee or-
268 1veganizations, one scholar views this interpretation as unjustified after
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, which extensively amended the
NLRA.269
The Taft-Hartley Act reaffirmed the NLRA's endorsement of
freely chosen employee representatives and collective bargaining, but
for the first time it restrained union activities, proscribing coercion of
employees and secondary boycotts as unfair labor practices.270 "[A]
new balance was achieved by imposing corresponding obligations on
labor organizations. The government, instead of aiding one side, now
stands in the center."271 This interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act
gives new meaning to the NLRA's Findings and Policy Statement that
"the policy of the United States [is] to. . . encourag[e] the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and . . . protect the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of their own choosing. 27 2 Together the legisla-
tive history of the two acts27 provides additional support for the
Chicago Rawhide, Hertzka & Knowles, and Northeastern University rul-
ings and also provides a basis for a statutory argument by which
265 Id
266 Id at 121. The data showed a 29% difference between management and hourly employees
in overall job satisfaction. Id This pattern appeared in response to most of the other survey items
as well. Id
267 Id at 124-25.
268 See supra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.
269 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976)).
270 B. MELTZER, supra note 131, at 42-44.
271 A. Cox, D. BOK &, R. GORMAN, CASES ON LABOR LAW 93-94 (1977), quoted in Jackson,
supra note 207, at 835.
272 NLRA, supra note 14, at § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
273 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
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United States companies may adopt Japanese labor relations within the
existing legal framework.
Protection for employee free choice and appropriate judicial stan-
dards for review are explored in detail by one commentator who rec-
ommends adoption of an actual interference or domination test.
274
This standard would afford legal protection against employers who
promise to work cooperatively with a non-union employee committee
and then renege. In addition, the worker's right to free choice itself,
together with NLRA provisions covering bargaining elections, would
allow workers to select a different form of representation, including
joint committees formed on employer initiative.275 "Today, unlike the
early years of the NLRA, if the employer is a liar, the labor organiza-
tion market assures he will pay for it."2 76 -Adoption of an actual domi-
nation standard would permit Japanese-style alternatives under United
States law. Further, the Board would retain corollary unfair labor
practice rules which would ensure fair elections, protect union activists
from discriminatory discharge, require employers to bargain, and regu-
late and protect the right to strike. These assurances, plus the power of
the courts to review grievance dispositions and to enforce negotiated
agreements, would prevent the disadvantages of Japanese labor rela-
tions-relatively frequent dispute actions, employer intimidation, cam-
paign interference-from also taking hold.277
Thus far, United States experience with Japanese-style labor rela-
tions has been positive when programs are supported by long-term
management commitment, adequate funds and careful training.
278
These requirements are substantial, but business management counsel-
274 Jackson, supra note 207.
275 NLRA, supra note 14, at § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976). A certified bargaining representative
may be challenged by a decertification election after one year's tenure. Id
276 Jackson, supra note 207, at 845. The author of an earlier article proposes a compromise
standard. Note, supra note 218. In his opinion, employee committees should not have the full
legal status accorded traditional unions, evidently because he considers any employer assistance
suspect or at least slightly coercive. He also recommends that employer coercion be judged by
examining the employer's motive. This standard would be difficult to apply and further, for the
reasons stated in Jackson's article, the Board need not prefer traditional unions to protect em-
ployee free choice.
277 Cf. GETMAN, GOLDBERG & HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND RE-
ALrY (1976) (empirical study suggests that the Board should be less concerned with preserving
laboratory conditions in bargaining elections and should permit freer, more informed employee
choice by tolerating a broader range of employer propaganda but penalizing discriminatory dis-
charges more effectively).
278 See infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
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ors deem them necessary. 279 Despite the high investment required,
some companies have adopted the principle feature of Japanese labor
relations-cooperation between workers and management.28 0  Delta
Airlines has not laid off any workers in almost two decades, despite fuel
shortages, the air traffic controllers' strike and the recent recession.28'
While flying shorter, more costly routes and paying generous employee
benefits, Delta's 1980 profits led the industry at more than double those
of the second most profitable carrier.2 82 Another example is the Har-
mon Industries quality of worklife project. Since its inception, em-
ployee grievances have declined by fifty-one percent, job security and
productivity have improved, and management estimates that the pro-
ject has resulted in a no-cost savings of $3,000 per hourly employee
over a fifty-five month period.28 3 As these cases illustrate, Japanese-
style labor relations can be successfully used with or without traditional
labor union organizations. 284 The success of Japanese subsidiaries in
the United States-among them YKK Company's version of industrial
democracy,285 Honda's Marysville, Ohio, plants, and Nissan's new
Tennessee facility 28 6-also argue for a less protective legal approach.
279 See generally Workplace Democracy and Industrial Policy, LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 110,
at 171 (June 28, 1982); PASCALE & ATHOS, supra note 3; Takeuchi, supra note 4.
280 See supra note 3. See also Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 165; Coppus Engineering, 240 F.2d
at 564; Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 625, supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text.
281 Delta Soars, supra note 182.
282 Id
283 Macy, supra note 184, at 42. The author implies that the lower grievance rate is due to
fewer complaints rather than to any change in the definition or processing of grievances. Id Job
security was measured by a combination of factors. Id More jobs were created, increasing the
hourly employment level 55%; 70 existing jobs were saved; the rates of attrition declined 72 and
95% (for involuntary turnover, i.e. discharges, retirement). Id "Daily output per hourly em-
ployee, adjusted for inflation, rose twenty-three percint. . . . [N]et product reject cost rates de-
dined 39 percent, while the rate of customer returns decreased by 47 percent ... . Some of the
gains are attributable to technological and capital inputs; however, many can be attributed to the
cooperative labor-management change." Id at 41-42. The $3,000 savings per employee, a net
discounted figure, is attributed to labor-management cooperation under the project and to other
unstated reasons. Id at 42. While behavioral and performance results were positive, attitudinal
measurements were mixed. Id Macy speculates that the explanation for these equivocal findings
may be increasingly higher critical worker aspirations, which the quality of worklife project itself
enhances. Id Macy's article summarizes data from a 55 month period from 1972-1976. Id For
more detailed information see B. MAcY, G. LEDFORD JR. & E. LAWLER III, AN ASSESSMENT OF
THE BOLIVAR QUALITY OF WORK LIFE EXPEIaMENT. 1972-1979 (1980).
284 Employees at Harmon Industries are members of the United Auto Workers. MAcY, supra
note 184, at 41. All 37,000 Delta Airlines employees, except pilots and dispatchers, are non-union.
Delta Soars, supra note 182.
285 N. SASAKI, supra note 49, at 114-15.
286 See Buss, Japanese-OwnedAuto Plants in the U.S. Present a Tough Challengefor the UAW,
Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1983, § 2, at 33, col. 4. See also Honda's Accord-How a Japanese Firm is
Faring in its Dealings with Workers in the U.S., Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 6; Nissan's
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"One trend seems very clear. The time is ripe for the United States
industrial relations system to seriously consider cooperative union-
management programs along with their traditional contractual and col-
lective bargaining structures and processes." '287
4. Other Obstacles to Cooperation
a. Labor conflict resolution
Formal adjudication plays a large role in settling United States
labor disputes. The NLRA encourages arbitration,28 8 which is the final
step in the grievance process in ninety-six percent of United States col-
lective bargaining contracts.28 9 A United States arbitrator sits as a
judge and, although not bound by legal precedents, the arbitrator's de-
cision must rest on an interpretation of the rights and duties contained
in the contract under dispute.290 By contrast, in Japan many disputes
are settled before reaching an adjudicatory stage.2 91 A Japanese arbi-
trator or conciliator does not make a clear-cut decision about who is
right and wrong or examine the respective rights of the parties.2 92 The
arbitrator's chief function is to dispell bad feelings and re-establish har-
mony by "'maruku osameru' (to settle in a circle), [which] means to
settle things in a way that satisfies both parties equally."293
United States dispute resolution procedures reflect and contribute
to the adversarial nature of traditional labor-management relations.
Rational, objective determinations of legal rights and consequent win-
ners and losers inevitably separate the parties psychologically, cur-
tailing any established cooperation.294 Thus, implementation of
Japanese-style dispute settlement may be a necessary complement to
effective use of Japanese-style labor-management relations. One possi-
bility is to augment grievance procedures, which typically involve two
stages of labor-management conference before arbitration,295 with a
provision for conciliation.296 Although conciliation could simply pro-
Tennessee WorkersAdopt Japanese Way to Happy Days, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 9, 1983, § 1, at 10,
col. I.
287 Macy, supra note 184, at 43.
288 NLRA, supra note 14, § 201(b), 29 U.S.C. § 171(b) (1976).
289 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) No. 51, at 5 (1979).
290 B. MELTZER, supra note 131, at 32-34.
291 See supra note 161.
292 See T. HANAMI, supra note 74, at 58, 203-04.
293 Id at 58.
294 Goldberg, supra note 61, at 277-78 (discussing arbitration).
295 B. MELTZER, supra note 74, at 161-62 (grievance and arbitration procedure of an illustrative
collection bargaining agreement).
296 In 1979 only three percent of this nation's collective bargaining agreements contained medi-
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long a dispute if the parties refused the conciliator's advisory solution,
if the ethic of cooperation were sufficiently strong and the conciliator
was respected by both sides, settlement short of formal adjudicatory
process would be more likely to salvage worker-management
harmony.2
97
This suggestion is not new to United States labor relations. The
Taft-Hartley Act established the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, but its activity is sharply confined.298 In the 1930s and 1940s
labor arbitrators were divided into two factions. One group felt that
arbitrators should act as neutral assistants to help parties solve their
problems and restore their relationship. 299 The other group thought
that an arbitrator should restrict his considerations to legal contract in-
terpretation.3o  The latter group prevailed.0 1  Professor Stephen
Goldberg, an experienced labor arbitrator, recently wrote that "[t]he
focus on winning the particular grievance tends . . ., to distract the
parties from their long term relational interests. ' 30 2 Although the de-
gree to which adversarial dispute resolution has affected labor-manage-
ment cooperation in the United States is difficult to assess, dispute
resolution techniques will have a significant influence on the form
which Japanese-style labor relations assume in the United States.
b. Democracy in the work place
While true employee freedom of choice may allow more coopera-
tive, less adversarial forms of labor organization, it will also allow em-
ployees who are dissatisfied with Japanese-style arrangements to join
trade unions. When Honda hired workers for its new Marysville, Ohio
motorcycle plant, it hired few experienced auto workers with past
UAW membership, ostensibly because it wanted fresh people, willing
to accept job rotations to avoid layoffs, and ready to absorb Honda's
quality credo.30 3 Most employees attended extensive training sessions
ation provisions. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) No. 51, at 5
(1979).
297 Goldberg, supra note 61, at 283. Widespread use of mediation rather than arbitration also
would substantially reduce the costs and time involved. Id at 282-84.
298 "The Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation services available... only
as a last resort and in exceptional cases." Taft-Hartley Act, supra note 269, at § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
sec. 173(d) (1976).
299 Goldberg, supra note 61, at 272-73.
300 Id at 273.
301 Id
302 Id at 278. See also Stepp, Baker & Barrett, Helping Labor and Management See and Solve
Problems, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 15, 20 (1982).
303 Honda's Accord supra note 285.
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in Ohio or Japan which emphasized quality, productivity, and the link
between these factors and job security.3 °4 In its first few months of
operation, employees reported that management informed them of fu-
ture plans and solicited their suggestions, which engendered high mo-
rale and a desire to do well.30 5 Honda also minimized the distinction
between workers and management by providing a common parking lot
and cafeteria and requiring both groups to wear identical white
uniforms. 3°6 The uniforms became the focus of a labor dispute, how-
ever, when a few workers wore hats with UAW insignias on the job.30 '
Management ordered these hats removed, the employees refused, and
the UAW filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Honda had
committed an unfair labor practice by interfering with the employee's
rights to organize, form, join, or assist labor organizations.30 8
Honda argued that its uniform policy promoted team work, main-
tained product quality (i.e. by eliminating buckles or buttons which
could scratch painted surfaces), and encouraged cleanliness. 3 9  The
last argument appears entirely disingenuous since the UAW patches
and caps in dispute would rarely if ever threaten cleanliness. Further,
the teamwork and quality arguments seemed to be euphemisms for an
anti-union animus. Honda stated that identical attire would encourage
employees to look upon one another as members of the Honda team
whose common goal was to produce the best possible product; any vari-
ation in apparel would tend to weaken this commitment. 3 '0  This
cause-effect reasoning is tenuous and invites the assumption that it was
a transparent attempt to keep the union out. Honda's unspoken argu-
ment must have been that the insignia threatened to encourage unioni-
zation which, in turn, would threaten not only product quality, but
Honda's system of personnel management.
The Supreme Court previously had ruled that wearing union in-
signia on the job was a protected activity unless special circumstances
existed which outweighed the employee's democratic rights in the
workplace.3 1 In Japan, the right of employees to wear union ribbons
is an open question. Most recent decisions have favored employers,




307 Honda ofAmerica Mfg., Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 725 (1982).
308 See NLRA, supra note 14, at § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
309 Honda ofAmerica, 260 N.L.R.B. at 726.
310 Id
311 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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attention to their work. 12 In the Honda insignia situation, the Board
decided that special circumstances were absent because Honda had
failed to produce any evidence which showed that their uniform rule
actually produced the results claimed. 3  Intuitive suppositions were
insufficient.314
This decision indicates another legal constraint on Japanese-style
labor relations in the United States. The American emphasis on par-
ties' legal rights tends to force a psychological wedge between employ-
ers and employees.315 It seems there will and always should be a
tension in the work place between cooperation and assertions of
rights, 316 because protected legal rights and individual freedom of
choice are values central to United States labor policy as well as to
society at large. If both employers and employees viewed their rela-
tionship as one in which common interests in the company's success
overshadowed differences, they could reduce this stress between coop-
eration and assertion of rights. United States labor law should at least
permit, if not endorse, freely chosen forms of labor organization which
embody this less stressful attitude.
IV. CONCLUSION
Japanese cultural history emphasizes the importance of harmoni-
ous social relationships based on emotional ties, an attitude which is
reflected in Japanese labor relations practices where cooperation be-
tween labor and management is the norm. Cultural heritage also gov-
erns the Japanese attitude toward law and labor dispute resolution.
Due to this influence, conflict between workers and management is
most often resolved through consultation or, less frequently, through
emotional confrontation and mediated compromise. United States la-
bor policy and law, however, emerged from a completely different set-
ting which expected labor-management conflict rather than
cooperation. Unlike Japan, since disputes are expected, controls exist
312 6 DOINGr BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 111, at pt. XII, § 1.02[3][e].
313 Honda of America, 260 N.L.R.B. at 729.
314 I.d
315 See supra note 301 and accompanying text. Accord supra notes 57-67 (resort to legal pro-
ceedings disrupts Japanese social harmony), 138 (conciliation rather than adjudication resolves
most Japanese labor disputes) and accompanying text.
316 Honda's experience may soon be repeated in Smyrna, Tennessee, site of a new Nissan light
truck plant due to open in 1983. Nissan's Tennessee Workers Adopt Japanese Way to Happy Days,
supra note 286. Nissan desparately wants to keep its workers satisfied and fears that the union
will destroy the cooperative, family atmosphere Nissan is working to instill in its 950 American
employees. Id Local UAW organizers, though, predict that once the assembly line begins to roll,
tensions will rise and workers will turn to traditional U.S. labor organization for help. Id
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to ensure settlement through relatively elaborate contract and statutory
procedures, premised on rational, adjudicatory application of parties'
legal rights. Consequently, implementation of Japanese-style labor re-
lations in the United States presents some legal obstacles. In a union-
ized shop, employers must be careful that no labor-management
committee deals with matters which are reserved by law to the exclu-
sive union bargaining agent. Joint committees in a non-union setting,
while free to set their own agendas, are suspect under the prevailing
assumption that the more powerful employer will dominate any com-
mon endeavor and prevent employees from freely choosing their own
representatives. Nonetheless, some courts have approved employer-
employee committees as a more cooperative alternative to traditional
trade union representation when there is no evidence of actual em-
ployer coercion.3 17 This line of decisions corresponds with a call by
both labor and management leaders for a new, more cooperative ap-
proach to United States labor relations. The extent of employer influ-
ence over cooperative labor management groups, however, will always
be mitigated by the enforceable legal rights of the parties and by legal
rules designed to protect workers' free choice, as shown by the recent
Honda case. Thus, while United States legal constraints on union or-
ganization are not absolute barriers, they do create limits for United
States implementation of Japanese-style labor relations, and they will
inevitably affect the impact of such methods on American industry.
Marcia J Cavens
317 See supra notes 240-52 and accompanying text.
